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6In times of rapid technological progress and increasing digitalisation in many areas 
of work and life, it is more important than ever to provide young people with the best 
possible skills for their entry into the world of work. It is certainly important to provide 
them with a solid theoretical knowledge base. However, it is also important to impart 
practical skills to ensure that they are able to adapt to the needs of the labour market. 
Post-school education in Italy, while providing good formal skills in this respect, 
is not sufficiently responsive to the needs of the labour market. With this in mind, 
dual training models have become politically more attractive in Italy and are already 
being implemented. But despite political support and the reforms in recent years, the 
popularity of dual training models has hardly increased. 
From an international point of view, this development is hardly surprising. On the one 
hand, interest in dual vocational training is increasing: learning a trade at two locations 
– in a company and at a part-time vocational school – means that apprentices gain 
valuable professional experience while they are still training, which enables a smoother 
transition to the labour market. As a result, there is less youth unemployment and a 
better supply of skilled labour for industry. 
On the other hand, reforms of this kind often encounter a major obstacle when it comes 
to practical implementation: a lack of commitment by the companies, especially in 
countries where an in-company apprenticeship tradition is absent. First and foremost, 
companies see training as an operational loss: why pay to train an apprentice when 
qualified employees can be recruited directly on the labour market? What businesses 
often fail to see is that in-house training does not merely incur costs, but that it also 
results in monetary benefits, and sometimes in net profits before training has even been 
completed. 
However, the question is: under which conditions? The costs and benefits of training 
are not invariables, they depend on a wide of variety of parameters such as the level 
of apprentices’ pay, the industry in question, the duration of training, recruiting costs 
for qualified skilled workers on the labour market – not to mention the quality of the 
training course. 
To examine the situation, this study uses simulations to investigate how these 
parameters would have to be designed in Italy in order to make dual training more 
attractive for Italian businesses. The conclusions derived in this report are intended to 
assist Italian policymakers and employers to make more evidence-based decisions, to 
ensure that Italy’s labour force investments are more likely to yield positive returns. 
Preface
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8Executive Summary
Countries with a high proportion of young people choosing apprenticeship training rather 
than either general education or full-time schooling options have not only demonstrated 
low youth unemployment rates but also distinctively lower ratios of youth unemployment 
relative to the overall unemployment rates of the country. Therefore, many people 
consider apprenticeship training as a possible and potentially powerful solution to the 
problem of an often prolonged and difficult transition for youths from school to the 
labour market. In recent reports, the OECD diagnosed substantial skills mismatch and 
skills shortages in Italy, and also proposed to improve the quality of apprenticeship 
training in Italy, and to promote the dual form of apprenticeship training (OECD 2017a,b). 
However, apprenticeship systems demand the high involvement of firms, which is not 
common in countries that do not have a long tradition of apprenticeship training (as 
is the case in Switzerland or Germany, for example). As many firms fear the costs of 
training apprentices, and despite political support, the dissemination of apprenticeship 
models has not enjoyed much success in the last ten years. 
If one wants to increase the popularity of the apprenticeship type of training, it is 
important to provide reliable information to firms about circumstances in which 
apprenticeship models are a potential win-win-win situation, creating benefits not only 
for individuals and the state, but also for the training firms. One way of doing this is to 
measure the costs and benefits of firms that train apprentices; however, representative 
data are currently only available for Germany and Switzerland and, more recently, for 
Austria. In this study, we will – for several reasons – not measure the costs and benefits 
of existing training schemes in Italy, but instead simulate the costs and benefits for 
Italian firms that would train in one of nine occupations in very different economic 
sectors. To be able to simulate these outcomes, we use data from Switzerland, where, 
in the course of a decade, more than twenty thousand training and non-training firms 
have provided extensive data on their investments, benefits of training, and reasons for 
either training or refraining from doing so. This study therefore analyses the question 
of whether an average Italian firm could expect a net benefit when training apprentices 
in a similar manner to Swiss firms. 
The nine occupations for which we simulated the net costs of training are in alphabetical 
order: Application developers and software engineers, bricklayers, car mechanics, 
commercial bank employees, cooks, electricians, mechanical technicians, shop 
salespersons, and waitresses/waiters. 
The simulation model consists of three components, for which we use data from the 
most recent Swiss cost and benefit survey, complemented with Italian wage data. These 
components are: 
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1. the costs that arise during the training period, 
2.  the benefits that firms can generate during the training period by using apprentices 
as substitutes for unskilled and skilled workers, and 
3.  the benefits that a firm can potentially generate after the end of the training period 
i.e. by filling vacancies for skilled workers with their own apprentices. 
While we are unable to provide representative figures of the potential size of the hiring 
costs saved in Italy, we received over 150 responses to our online survey across the various 
occupations and from the north, centre and south of Italy, as well as from participants 
from our workshops with sector-level representatives. The results show that potential 
savings from not having to recruit skilled workers externally are substantial in Italy and 
may justify a corresponding net investment in apprenticeship training. 
Additionally, we also simulate the consequences of our scenarios and models on the 
private rates of return to education, which is the net benefit that the apprentices 
could expect over their lifetime. Our simulations show that most Italian firms can only 
break even by the end of training (having no net training costs) if apprentice wages are 
significantly below the current minimum wage in Italy1. Thus, high expected net training 
costs are likely to reduce the willingness of firms to participate in apprenticeship 
training. Moreover, the ability of a training firm to break even is an important factor 
given recent recommendations to change the current open-ended apprenticeship 
contracts into fixed-term training contracts similar to those in Switzerland or Germany 
(Cedefop 20172). An advantage of a fixed-term training contract could be that apprentices 
are recognized as trainees, and thus receive more and better quality training while they 
are at the workplace. In turn, more individuals might be interested in applying for 
apprenticeship positions. Moreover, to the extent that better training leads to higher 
wages for skilled workers, apprentices would be more willing to accept lower wages 
during training.
The results of our simulations for all occupations and scenarios show that the net costs 
in all models using a low apprentice wage scenario are close to zero or even negative in 
at least one of our proposed training models in five out of nine occupations, in other 
words they generate a net benefit for the training firm. In the high-wage scenario 
where apprentice wages are set at 50 % of a skilled worker salary during the entire 
training period, net training costs are substantial across all training models and in all 
training occupations. Net training costs are particularly high for application developers 
and software engineers, car mechanics, commercial bank employees, and mechanical 
technicians. However, in these occupations, we also observe that firms face very high 
1  Apprentice pay in Italy is set by collective bargaining at the sector level (similar to Germany). To account for 
such sector-specific differences in apprentice wages, our simulations consider wage scenarios where the 
apprentice wage is set as a percentage of the relevant skilled worker wage (rather than an absolute wage level 
that applies to all apprentices).
2  Cedefop (2017), p.63: “The legislation is clear about the prime purpose of Type 1 [apprentice contract], 
which is to deliver alternative learning pathways for earning a qualification from the formal education and 
training system (as stated in Legislative Decree MLPS/MIU 81/2015). However, the open-ended nature of the 
employment contract may appear in contrast with Type 1 prime purpose, although there is a possible option to 
terminate the contract once the educational qualification is achieved. Most companies tend to consider Type 1 
primarily as a standard open-ended employment contract and so as a contractual option for recruitment, rather 
than a training investment.“
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hiring costs to recruit qualified workers and incur a substantial productivity loss during 
the adaptation period until new hires become fully productive. When accounting for the 
benefit that firms generate when retaining a graduate apprentice as a skilled worker 
(and consequently not having to pay hiring costs for external hires), we find that all 
occupations would be profitable for training firms in the low-wage scenario, to the 
extent that at least 50 % of former apprentices stay on as skilled workers after training.
In the high-wage scenario, we find that potential savings on hiring costs would cover 
a firm’s net costs as long as 100 % of apprentices were retained as skilled workers after 
training, except for cooks, application developers and software engineers. Therefore, 
incorporating potential benefits to the firms after training has ended is important 
to obtain a more complete picture of the financing and the benefits with regard to 
providing apprenticeship training at the workplace. 
Using wage scenarios for apprentices, we also calculate the rates of return to education 
for apprentices, which is important because talented individuals are only interested 
in pursuing an apprenticeship if they can expect to acquire a substantial amount 
of marketable skills that will be useful on the labour market later in their career. 
We find that even in the high-wage scenario, only four out of nine occupations 
(application developers and software engineers, car mechanics, commercial employees 
and mechanical technicians) yield significant returns that exceed 5 % per year of 
education. On the other hand, we also find substantial expected net costs for firms that 
train apprentices occupations with high individual returns to apprenticeship training, 
there would be some scope to lower apprentice wages without discouraging applications 
from qualified individuals, while at the same time increasing a firm’s willingness to 
offer training positions in these occupations. In the remaining training occupations, the 
wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers is too small to justify individuals 
investing more in apprenticeship training (by accepting low pay for 2-3 years). In other 
words, the training models for which we have made simulations would not allow firms 
and apprentices to gain sufficient benefits (apart from a firm’s savings in future hiring 
costs), and therefore, the willingness of the firms or potential apprentices to train or 
receive training in these occupations would be low. 
However, one could increase the attractiveness of training in these occupations. Potential 
apprentices might be willing to accept lower salaries during training as long as firms in 
turn invest more resources in training. To the extent that better training increases the 
skills that are also useful in other firms, apprentices could expect to be paid skilled wages 
that are above the levels observed on the current Italian labour market.
Finally, and not surprisingly, the simulated costs and benefits show a considerable 
heterogeneity, due to differences in the results per occupation in the Swiss data and 
to variations in the wage differentials between unskilled and skilled workers in the 
nine occupations in Italy. Thus, the question whether a training firm would have to 
expect net costs or whether it could generate a net benefit when applying a Swiss-
style training model depends on many factors that will differ from one occupation to 
another. Furthermore, the simulations show that results may vary considerably within 
a given occupation due to a different wage structure across firms of different sizes and 
across regions. In Italy, regional wage differences are large, so we also provide separate 
simulation results for the three main regions (north, centre, south).
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In any case, the simulations show that policies that target an increase in the number 
of apprenticeships would need to take into account these heterogeneities between 
occupations, firms and regions. 
The four main conclusions that we can draw from our report are the following: 
1.  The chances of firms breaking even at the end of the training period of an 
apprenticeship are higher for three-year programmes than in shorter apprenticeships, 
but only in a scenario where apprentice wages are substantially lower than skilled 
worker salaries. 
2.  A firm’s costs for hiring qualified workers from the external labour market are 
substantial. To the extent that training firms can retain apprentices as skilled 
workers, the savings associated with not having to recruit and train externally are 
large enough to cover all or most of the firm’s training costs. In most of the nine 
occupations, at least one or two models and scenarios produce net benefits, or firms 
can expect savings in hiring costs that could offset net costs in a low apprentice wage 
scenario. However, once apprentice wages increase to 50 % of a skilled worker’s wage 
for that occupation, it becomes very difficult for firms to recover their initial training 
investment, even assuming that 100 % of apprentices are subsequently retained as 
skilled workers. 
3.  Private rates of return to individuals from obtaining a VET qualification are rather low 
in many occupations and therefore also need to be considered. In some occupations, 
extending the programme duration to four years may yield even more favourable 
outcomes for firms.
4.  Improvements in the quality of training programmes that subsequently improve 
the labour market outcomes of apprentices could be a necessity to secure talented 
applicants for the programmes, and at the same time reduce dropout rates. The latter 
may hamper the willingness of firms to train for some occupations because they 
would increase the net costs of training. Conversely, when individuals can expect a 
high-wage premium from obtaining a VET qualification, they will be more willing 
to apply for apprenticeships and to partly finance their own education by accepting 
lower wages during the training period.
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After the outbreak of various financial crises in 2008, persistently high youth 
unemployment rates in many industrialised countries brought the apprenticeship 
training models predominantly used in German-speaking countries (Austria, Germany, 
and Switzerland) to the attention of policy makers, business leaders, academic scholars 
and the general public (e.g. OECD 2010). Countries with a high proportion of youths who 
choose apprenticeship training rather than general education or full-time schooling 
options have not only achieved lower youth unemployment rates but also significantly 
lower ratios of youth unemployment relative to the overall unemployment rates of 
the country. In addition, skill shortages or skill mismatches are not as frequent in 
these countries as in countries with predominantly school-based general education 
programs.3
Although many consider apprenticeship training to be a possible and potentially 
powerful solution to the problem of an often prolonged and difficult transition for youths 
from school to the labour market, these systems demand the high involvement of firms, 
which is not common in countries that do not have this tradition of apprenticeship 
training. Delegating a substantial part of educational responsibilities to firms makes 
them not only beneficiaries but also providers of education, which comes at a cost. As 
firms are used to a situation where either the public or the individuals themselves pay 
for education, it is not surprising that there is a lack of enthusiasm from firms to bear 
these costs. Looking to countries where apprenticeships are still common does not 
automatically take away such fears, because cost-benefit analyses in Germany have 
shown for decades that the average German training firm4 must bear the net costs of 
training and that only rather strict (confrontational) labour market regulations allow 
these firms to recoup these net investments in the long run (for the most recent study, 
see Schönfeld et al. 2016). In other countries, such as Austria, Denmark or Norway, 
public subsidies help keep the firms active in the training market. However, the fiscal 
situation does not allow every country to support training firms, and, in most countries, 
firms are not particularly eager to pay higher taxes initially to receive some subsidies 
later. Finally, the political support for apprenticeships is quite often the consequence of 
empty treasuries and politicians looking for training models that put less strain on the 
public budgets, which contributes to raising major doubts in economic circles that the 
3  This report follows closely a similar report on England (Wolter and Joho 2018) using data simulations for Italy. 
Chapters 2-4 are also based on the respective chapters in the simulations for Spain (Wolter and Muehlemann 
2015). We follow as closely as possible the lines of argument and the assumptions used in the Spanish and 
English case to allow for future comparative work between different countries for which we have simulated the 
costs and benefits of apprenticeship training.
4  A training firm in the German, Austrian, or Swiss context is a firm whose main business is not training but the 
production of goods and services. Therefore, when we speak of training or non-training firms in this text, this 
should not be confounded with training providers, whose main business is training students for firms.
Combating youth 
unemployment
Firms have to pay
1 Introduction3
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support for apprenticeships is just an attempt to shift the costs of training and education 
from the government to the firms. For these and other reasons, and despite the political 
support, the dissemination of apprenticeship models has not seen much success in the 
last ten years. 
Therefore, if one wants to propagate the apprenticeship type of training, it is important 
to provide reliable information to firms about circumstances in which apprenticeship 
models are a potential win-win-win situation, creating financial benefits not only for 
individuals and the public, but also for the training firms. One way of doing so is by 
measuring the costs and benefits of firms that train apprentices; however, representative 
data are currently only available for Germany and Switzerland and, more recently, 
Austria. Measuring the costs and benefits of apprenticeship in case studies, covering just 
a handful of firms, as has been done in some countries, can lead to deceptive results for 
non-training firms, as the selective cases are usually not representative (e.g. Helper et 
al. 2016 for the United States). Furthermore, measuring cost and benefits in a country 
that is in the phase of either introducing or reforming apprenticeships has at least 
three potential additional shortcomings. Firstly, the training models used by training 
firms often differ considerably across firms; secondly, in a phase of introduction and 
reform one cannot always be sure that the models in place are performing as expected; 
and thirdly, the models are very often not stable over time but subject to constant 
adaptations and changes. In other words, trying to measure something that displays 
high diversity across firms, regions, and economic sectors and changes from day to day 
has limited informational value for non-training firms in their decision-making process 
and for policymakers evaluating the framework conditions of their system. Therefore, 
we have adopted a ‘simulation’ approach for this report. 
Compared internationally, participation rates in employer-sponsored non-formal 
training and work-related formal training are low in Italy, despite a large reform in 
2003 that was aimed at increasing the participation of firms in the apprenticeship 
system (Cedefop 2017). In this study, we therefore both propose and test whether 
apprenticeship training could be a viable way for firms in Italy to expand work-based 
training and, if so, under what conditions. 
We will not measure the costs and benefits of existing training schemes in Italy, but we 
will simulate the costs and benefits for Italian firms that would train in ten occupations 
in very different economic sectors. To be able to simulate these outcomes, we use data 
from Switzerland,5 where, over a decade, more than twenty thousand training and non-
training firms have provided extensive data on their investments, benefits of training, 
and reasons for either training or refraining from doing so. We use this data as the base 
for our simulations, combining it with labour market data from Italy. The advantage of 
simulating, rather than measuring cost and benefits, is that we can choose different 
models and parameters and, therefore, measure the sensitivity of outcomes for these 
assumptions. This allows us not only to make a statement about whether training is 
beneficial but also to define both the framework and the parameters of a hypothetical 
model that would work (see Muehlemann and Wolter 2017). 
5  Readers wishing to know more about the Swiss apprenticeship training system may find useful information in 
this documentation (SERI 2017).
Measuring costs and 
benefits
Low participation rate of 
firms
Simulating a Swiss 
training scheme for Italy
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In summary, this study analyses the question of whether an average Italian firm could 
expect a net benefit when training apprentices using a system similar to Swiss training 
firms. However, we do not evaluate the current cost-benefit situation of providing 
apprenticeship training in Italy, nor the effects of the most recent training reform in 
2015 (Cedefop 2017).6 We also (see chapter 6) simulate the consequences of our scenarios 
and models for the private rates of return to education,7 which is the net benefit that 
the apprentices could expect over their lifetime. This addition to the present study is 
necessary because, as will be shown later, most firms in Italy in most of the occupations 
for which we run our simulations will only break even (they do not bear any net training 
costs) if they pay apprentices’ salaries that are below the current minimum wage. 
6  This study complements a similar earlier study done in Spain (Wolter and Muehlemann 2014) and England 
(Wolter and Joho 2018), using the same methodology. 
7  We are referring to private rates of return to education when we calculate the costs and returns to education 
from the perspective of the individual in either training or education. 
Simulating rates of 
return to education for 
individuals
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2  The importance of costs and benefits  
for the decision to train apprentices
The willingness of firms to train apprentices can be described as the “conditio sine qua 
non” (necessary condition) for the existence of an apprenticeship training system. 
Irrespective of how much a government desires an apprenticeship training system, it 
cannot be established without firms that are willing to take on apprentices. Therefore, it 
is crucial to understand both the motivation of firms to invest in apprenticeship training 
and the conditions that are necessary to persuade more firms to participate. 
Training investments, from the perspective of firms, are similar to all other business 
investments, which means that firms invest if they expect a sufficiently high return on 
investment (ROI) and that firms refrain from investing if they expect a loss. Empirical 
analyses8 of successful apprenticeship training models show that the sustainable 
engagement of firms mainly depends on training regulations, labour market regulations 
and institutions, and the education policy of the government. An example for the 
importance of the latter is the admissions policy and the financing of general education 
(high school and university). If the standards for admission to general schools are low and 
the financing of general education is predominantly public, then firms are confronted 
with a situation in which most of the talented youths will opt for the general education 
pathway. This would leave only the less talented students for the apprenticeship market, 
which would in turn lead to a situation in which the training costs for firms might simply 
be too high (because less talented apprentices would need more support and training9) 
and the productivity of the potential apprentices too low. Even in the case where the 
net costs of training are bearable, firms might decide not to train because the skill level 
of the potential apprentices would still be lower than the expected skill level of either 
university or college graduates after a short period of on-the-job training.10 In other 
words, policy makers have many ways of not only directly influencing a firm’s costs and 
benefits of training but also influencing the costs of alternative methods of recruiting 
skilled workers that could compete with the decision to train apprentices. 
A critical point, as with all other investments, is that the costs of training arise early in 
the investment period, whereas the benefits come either later, sometimes too late, or 
not at all. The latter may occur because other firms poach the trained workers, because 
the trained workers leave after training for further education, or for other reasons. In 
8  Wolter and Ryan (2011) provide an extensive description of the theoretical foundations for analysing firms’ 
decisions on whether to be active in apprenticeship training. Muehlemann and Wolter (2014) provide a 
literature overview of cost-benefit studies and empirical issues related to the question of how the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training influence firms’ training behaviour.
9  Muehlemann et al. (2013) show that Swiss training firms invest additional instruction time in apprentices with 
low school grades, but only to the extent that firms can still expect to break even by the end of training.
10  During the workshops in Bari, this argument was also made by representatives of the IT industry (the 
occupations of application developer and software engineer). As a result, many firms in the IT industry prefer 
to hire university graduates.
Companies’ motivations 
for investment
Return on investment
Risk of losses
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the imPortanCe of Costs and benefits for the deCision to train aPPrentiCes 
such cases, the net investments at the end of the training period are no longer covered 
by the benefits that would have been generated if the trained worker had stayed with 
the training company. The uncertainty about the timing of the benefits, the amount 
of the benefits, or even the risk that no benefits are collected, is therefore crucial for a 
firm’s decision to be active in the apprenticeship training market. A sustainable training 
system must, therefore, find ways to reduce the risk that the training might not generate 
a sufficiently large benefit to cover a firm’s investment. Looking at the existing models 
for which we have cost-benefit data, one can see that, broadly speaking, there are three 
different ways of doing so.
Firstly, the Swiss model generally allows firms to cover their training expenditures 
by the time the official training period ends, and the apprentice is free to leave the 
company. In such a situation, the threat of poaching is no longer a problem for the 
firm’s decision to train because even in the case where an apprentice leaves the 
company immediately after finishing the apprenticeship, the firm does not incur a 
loss. The challenge facing firms in Switzerland that train apprentices is to find ways for 
the apprentices to generate sufficiently high benefits for the firm during the training 
period while at the same time guaranteeing the provision of high-quality training to 
the apprentices (because training quality is monitored and enforced). The benefits 
mainly depend on training regulations that allow apprentices to spend much of their 
training time with the firm, working while employed by the firm and, finally, being 
productive while working. Such a system has the additional benefit that it enables high 
knowledge diffusion among companies, possibly contributing to the innovativeness of 
an industry as a whole. Rupietta and Backes-Gellner (2018) discuss how apprenticeship 
systems not only help the diffusion of knowledge from innovative to less innovative 
companies, but in a second step also increase the probability that training firms will 
create innovations themselves.11
The second case is the apprenticeship system in Germany, where labour market 
regulations at least partially protect the net investments of firms by reducing the 
labour market mobility of former apprentices (see e.g. Muehlemann et al., 2010). Rigid 
employment protection rules (like regulations that make dismissals either costly or 
almost impossible) not only secure stable jobs for the employed, but also reduce the 
labour market mobility of potentially mobile workers because employment protection 
reduces the number of job vacancies in the labour market. In such a situation, training 
firms anticipate that their own apprentices are likely to remain with the training 
company because the probability of receiving an outside job offer is low, as potential 
competitors have to retain their own workforce. Thus, a net investment in apprentices 
protects training firms at least partially from poaching. Informal or semi-formal 
institutions, such as employer associations, unions, or works councils, also reduce the 
possibility that other firms will actively poach apprentices after training by offering 
high wages. If labour markets are deregulated, however, firms must switch to a training 
policy that allows them to either reduce the net costs of training or even break even so 
as not to risk losing their investment to non-training firms. The reaction of German 
training firms during the last decade shows that this is exactly how firms responded to 
a decrease in the degree of employer protection legislation (Jansen et al., 2015). The fact 
that German firms have, over the course of the last decade, adopted a training strategy 
11  Rupietta and Backes-Gellner (2018) show that training firms have a higher probability of product and process 
innovation, and are more likely to apply for patents compared to firms who do not train apprentices.
Securing benefits during 
training (Switzerland)
Securing benefits after 
training (Germany)
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that increasingly resembles the strategy applied by Swiss firms provides an additional 
reason to use Swiss data for the simulations in this study.
The third model is the Austrian VET model. In Austria, firms generally bear substantial 
net costs, albeit somewhat lower than for German firms. However, there are two 
important differences compared to the German training system. Firstly, the reason 
for the net costs is not so much a result of apprentices not being used extensively in 
productive work, but rather the result of high relative apprentice pay compared to 
skilled workers. Secondly, public wage subsidies cover part of the net costs (similar to 
Denmark) and may be partly the reason why we observe high-wage levels in the first 
place. A comparison with Swiss firms that train apprentices in the same occupations 
shows that, if Austrian firms switched to relative apprentice pay levels comparable to 
Switzerland, most Austrian companies could break even at the end of the training period 
(see Moretti et al., 2017). The reason why Austrian firms are paying high apprentices’ 
salaries and accepting net training costs is likely related to the competition for talented 
apprentices. Since individuals can enrol in full-time vocational schools and also obtain 
a VET qualification, they might prefer that option if apprentice wages in the dual 
VET system were very low (in Switzerland full-time vocational schools are much less 
common). However, the empirical evidence shows that Austrian firms can recoup most 
of their training costs after the training period due to savings on future hiring costs 
In addition to systemic parameters that influence the average training pattern and 
strategies in a country as a whole, one can also observe differences in training strategies 
between firms of different sizes, sectors, occupations, and geographic locations that are 
related to differences in expected post-training benefits.
Very small firms are usually unable to offer future employment to (all of) their 
apprentices, and therefore need to break even by the end of the training period; 
otherwise, they are almost certain to lose their investment (see Muehlemann and 
Wolter, 2014, p. 16ff). The lower the chances that these firms can break even by the end 
of training, the lower the participation rate of small firms in apprenticeship training will 
be. As small firms are the backbone of the economy in many countries, the possibility 
of achieving net benefits within a short time frame is essential for the emergence of 
apprenticeship training.
Firms operating in sectors or training occupations that offer the possibility to learn skills 
specific to the training firm or occupation are better protected against the poaching of 
their trained apprentices, as apprentices would lose a considerable part of their skills 
when moving to another sector or firm. In particular, skilled workers in technically 
advanced firms operating at the forefront of technological progress are in such a 
position. 
The degree to which a firm can protect itself against losing its skilled workers also 
depends on the geographic location of the firm (Muehlemann and Wolter, 2011; 
Muehlemann et al., 2013). Although most firms do not use uniquely firm-specific skills, 
depending on their geographic location they might be just far away enough from the 
next firm that uses a similar set of skills that most employees would not accept the 
costs of either commuting or moving to another region for only a small salary increase. 
However, most firms operate either in economic regions with dense economic activity 
Securing benefits with 
public subsidies (Austria)
Other influential factors
Company size
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or in sectorial clusters that come with a high risk that there will be several employers 
looking for the same set of skills. In this situation, in order to have an incentive to 
be active in training, even bigger firms need the possibility to break even with their 
investments before the training ends.
Finally, even if the framework conditions in a country enable some firms to earn a net 
benefit from apprenticeship training, this is usually not the case for all firms, because 
the specific situation differs considerably between individual firms with respect to 
their potential to run an apprenticeship training programme profitably (see Wolter 
et al., 2006). The challenge for countries is that the framework conditions should be 
good enough for a sufficiently large share of companies to offer training positions. 
There will always be companies for which “buying” i.e. recruiting skilled workers from 
other firms is cheaper than training their own personnel internally (see Blatter et al., 
2016). However, the higher the probability that a training company can finish a training 
programme with a net benefit, the higher the chances that the training decision will not 
be affected by other firms’ recruitment strategies. 
The following chapter provides an overview of the most important components of the 
costs and benefits arising from apprenticeship training that a potential training firm 
must take into consideration when calculating its return on investment (ROI).
Framework conditions
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A cost-benefit model to calculate the net costs (or benefits) from the perspective of a 
firm has been used several times over the last two decades in Germany, Switzerland, 
and more recently Austria, to gather representative data on the costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship training. The model has been refined over time but has remained stable 
and supported for the most part since its conception in the 1970s. The lessons from the 
application of the model in different countries during different periods of the business 
cycle, and in hundreds of different occupational profiles covering most of the economic 
sectors in a modern economy, helps us to identify the most relevant parameters of 
the model to simulate net cost scenarios for a dual apprenticeship system outside the 
German-speaking countries, in this case for Italy. 
The model consists of three components, for which we use data from the most recent 
Swiss survey (Wolter and Strupler 2012) complemented by Italian wage data. The three 
components are (i) the costs that arise during the training period, (ii) the benefits that 
firms can generate during the training period by substituting apprentices for unskilled 
and skilled workers, and (iii) the benefits that a firm can potentially generate after the 
training period has ended i.e. by filling vacancies for skilled workers with their own 
apprentices. 
In particular, a firm’s cost components of apprenticeship training (as described in 
Muehlemann and Wolter, 2014, p.3) consist of the following categories:
1.  Wages of apprentices: regular wage payments, irregular wage payments, and 
compensation for food, travel costs, or living expenses.
2.  Costs of training personnel: costs for full-time, part-time, and external training 
personnel for the period in which they are unable to work productively because they 
are instructing apprentices.
3.  Recruitment and administrative costs: wage costs for administrative tasks and 
recruitment related to apprenticeship training.
4.  Costs of infrastructure: machinery/appliances for apprentices at the workplace, 
rent for premises necessary for apprenticeship training, cost of premises and 
infrastructure for company training centres.
5.  Cost of supplies: costs of supplies used for non-productive activities in the workplace; 
costs of books, learning software and videos; costs of working equipment.
Background of the model
Model components
3  The cost-benefit model and its 
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6.  Other costs: costs of fees (e.g. exams), costs of recruitment/administration related 
to apprenticeship training, and costs of external courses, duties, and taxes to third 
parties. 
A firm’s benefit components of apprenticeship training consist of the following 
categories: 
1.  The value of having apprentices perform skilled tasks is calculated as the time that 
apprentices spend on such tasks multiplied by the wage that a firm would need to 
pay skilled workers if no apprentices had been hired. That value, however, is further 
multiplied by the productivity of an apprentice relative to that of a skilled worker.12
2.  For unskilled tasks, the value to the firm of having an apprentice perform such work 
is simply the wage that the firm would have had to pay to an unskilled worker.13
Ultimately, the difference between the costs and benefits of training results in net 
benefits (or net costs) for the firm by the end of the training period.
As described in the previous chapter, there are many reasons why most firms need to 
either achieve net benefits or at least break even by the time the training contract ends, 
because all investments not covered by then are at risk of being lost if the trainee moves 
to another company or quits for other reasons. The current situation in Italy, however, 
does not imply an automatic termination of the contract between the apprentice and 
the training firm after training, because it is an open-ended contract (Cedefop 2017). If 
apprentices are more likely to stay on, savings in future hiring costs for skilled workers 
are a relevant element in the cost-benefit calculation of firms, as elaborated in the next 
subsection. 
For those firms that can expect all or at least some of their apprentices to stay with 
them for at least some time, an important additional (post-training) benefit comes into 
play. If a firm can fill vacancies for skilled workers with their own apprentices, they can 
save on hiring costs, which would then even justify a net investment by the time the 
formal training period has ended (see Muehlemann and Strupler Leiser, 2018). Although 
hiring an apprentice is costly, hiring skilled workers is usually much more expensive. 
Therefore, in the cost-benefit model, we also calculate the following costs that would 
arise from recruiting a skilled worker on the external labour market:
12  Thus, if it takes an apprentice twice as long to complete a certain task than it does a skilled worker, the relative 
productivity is 50 %, which means that the value to the firm of having an apprentice performing skilled work 
is half of the wage costs associated with employing a skilled worker.
13  Although unskilled work is not the goal of apprenticeship training, it can be an important element – at least 
at the beginning of the training period – for both the firm and the apprentice. For the apprentice, it does 
not matter much whether he or she learns behavioural skills, such as punctuality and precision, which are 
important in the work environment, by doing either skilled or unskilled work. What is more important is the 
fact that the apprentice has the opportunity as early as possible in the training period to learn these skills 
both effectively and efficiently. For the firms, the possibility of having apprentices do unskilled work offers an 
opportunity to improve the cost-benefit balance. As apprentices usually need some learning time before they 
can be entrusted with skilled tasks, in the absence of the availability of unskilled tasks, the apprentices would 
be unproductive for too long, thereby increasing the net costs and risk for a firm, so that it may refrain from 
offering training positions in the first place. Therefore, using apprentices to perform unskilled tasks is not bad 
overall, but quality assurance systems are certainly needed to ensure that apprentices are not mainly used as 
cheap labour. 
Benefit components
Net benefits or 
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1. Search costs (job advertisements, job interviews, etc.).
2.  Costs that stem from an initially lower productivity during the adaptation period, 
until a new hire reaches full productivity. Such costs only arise for external hires 
because they need to learn firm-specific processes and technologies.
3. Costs associated with the external training of newly hired workers. 
4.  Disruption costs due to informal training, as externally hired employees interrupt 
the work of other workers because they need instruction and help during the 
adaptation period. 
A firm can save all of these costs if it can successfully fill a vacancy with a former 
apprentice. 
In this study, we are unable to provide representative figures of the potential amount of 
hiring costs in Italy because such data is not available. For that reason, we conducted our 
own survey in Italian firms as a part of this project. With the exception of the occupation 
waitresses/waiters, we could obtain a sufficient number of responses to our survey to 
report average hiring costs (based on a total sample of 158 firms). Thus, for 8 out of 
9 occupations, we can report the search, adaptation and disruption costs associated 
with successfully filling a skilled worker vacancy by hiring a qualified worker from the 
external labour market.
The impact of the degree of loyalty to the training firm is, of course, decisive. If, as in 
Switzerland, two-thirds of the apprentices leave their training company after the end 
of training, a firm needs to train three apprentices to fill one vacancy (if the apprentices 
leave their training company voluntarily). In other words, the saved hiring costs for one 
vacancy, on average, would need to be high enough to compensate for the net costs of 
training three apprentices in Switzerland, which shows that saved hiring costs are an 
argument mainly for either (large) firms with an internal labour market or firms with 
very firm specific human capital and, therefore, also a reasonably high retention rate. 
However, given that apprenticeship contracts are open-ended in Italy, it is quite likely 
that the proportion of apprentices who continue to work with the training firm even 
after having obtained a VET qualification is considerably higher than in Switzerland. 
Nonetheless, if apprentice contracts were fixed-term contracts as in Switzerland (and as 
recommended by Cedefop 2017), the turnover rate of former apprentices may increase, 
which in turn would make it more important for firms to be able to break even by the 
end of training (probably by being able to adjust apprentice wages downwards compared 
to the current situation). 
Problems eliciting hiring 
costs for Italy
Mobility of apprentices 
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In this chapter, we provide arguments for the scenarios we have used to simulate the 
costs and benefits of potential apprenticeship models from the perspective of firms. 
The scenarios do not represent the current training models in Italy and are therefore not 
evaluations of the Italian apprenticeship system. However, they could fit into the Italian 
context, and we will provide arguments for our scenarios based on the experiences 
in Switzerland. We will elaborate on certain questions, such as why the duration of 
an apprenticeship may or should differ from occupation to occupation; what level of 
payment of a salary for apprentices would guarantee firms breaking even at the end 
of the training period; and how the quality, quantity, and specificity of training that 
a firm provides is reflected in the hiring costs of skilled labour. We will also provide 
information on issues that do not directly relate to the cost-benefit simulations but to 
the actual outcomes, such as the selection of apprentices and the matching of firms and 
apprentices in the apprenticeship labour market. These issues relate to our assumptions 
about the parameters in the models, and therefore call for an explanation. We conclude 
this chapter with information about the sources of the data used in our study. 
4.1 The simulation models
We calculate the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training for three different 
scenarios (models). Model 1 comes closest to the Swiss apprenticeship model, where 
apprentices enter training at the end of compulsory schooling as an alternative to full-
time general education. In Model 2, we assume that young people have completed an 
upper-secondary education and enter an apprenticeship programme as an alternative 
to studying at a university. Finally, Model 3 is a one-year extension of Model 2. Again, 
we base Model 3 on the assumption that apprentices enter the programme after having 
completed general upper-secondary education. The reason for extending Model 2 is 
that the framework of Model 2 might be too rigid in two respects. Firstly, apprentices 
may not be able to acquire the required work skills in a programme that lasts for only 
two years, not because of a lack of time spent in formal training, but because of a lack 
of time spent practising the newly acquired skills in the workplace. Secondly, firms that 
provide (and pay for) a substantial amount of workplace training might not be able to 
break even financially within a two-year training period because the apprentices do not 
spend enough time on productive tasks at the firm.
We base all our calculations regarding off-site instruction times on numbers similar 
to Swiss, German, or Austrian practice (and Spanish training programmes). All the 
plans are set for a two-year programme that totals 2,000 hours of training and work 
experience, of which, depending on the occupation, approximately 1,600 to 1,700 
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hours are formal instruction in vocational schools, and the remaining hours reflect 
work experience in a firm. In Model 1, we assume that the training plan for the off-
site education covers not only vocational skills but also some general skills, e.g. maths, 
mother tongue and foreign languages, that are necessary not only as a foundation to 
learn other skills, but also to be able to progress further in the educational system after 
an apprenticeship and to enter careers that include management responsibilities. In 
Models 2 and 3, we assume that the individuals have acquired all the necessary general 
skills before entering the apprenticeship programme and that the provider of education 
covers mostly vocational skills. 
The detailed assumptions in the three models for which we calculate the costs and 
benefits are as follows (see Table 1 for an overview).
In Model 1, we propose a training duration of three years, which is the minimum duration 
of many apprenticeship programmes in Switzerland for the training occupations 
for which we calculate the net costs in Italy. This model would be most appropriate 
for school-leavers after compulsory schooling (at the age of 16), who, similar to the 
German-speaking countries, would follow apprenticeship programmes instead of 
pursuing other full-time schooling options.14 The curricula used in the German-
speaking countries, therefore, also leaves room for learning general skills, such as 
mathematics and foreign languages. Therefore, to follow a Swiss training programme 
as closely as possible, we make the following assumptions: of the approximately 1,600 
hours learning vocational skills, 600 hours are delegated to firms and are taught by in-
firm trainers, which corresponds to approximately five hours of weekly instruction 
time at the firm (which comes close to the Swiss average). The rationale for delegating a 
considerable part of the vocational programme to firms is as follows: depending on the 
technologies used in the trained occupation, the quality of in-firm training should be 
superior to the same training in a vocational school, as firms are usually at the forefront 
of technological developments. Moreover, the public authorities experience substantial 
savings if they do not need to buy expensive machinery and tools for vocational schools. 
Such a situation is also beneficial for apprentices, as they have the opportunity to use the 
most up-to-date equipment in firms. An additional benefit of in-firm training is that, 
on most occasions, the training in firms is 1-to-1 teaching, whereas in schools, the same 
skills are not taught individually but rather in a class of up to 20 or more students. Given 
the nature of some skills, practical exercises are often necessary to become proficient; 
thus, the instruction of one apprentice (or a very small group) by one trainer in a firm 
seems to be much more appropriate than training a full class.15
14  The four main explanations in support of an “early” apprenticeship programme are as follows. Firstly, school-
leavers confronted with another three years or more of general schooling and, therefore, with the risk of 
dropping out of the educational system after compulsory schooling, are more likely to remain in the education 
system. Switzerland, which has one of the highest completion rates of upper-secondary education in the 
industrialised world (OECD, 2017a), shows that this strategy can be successful in reducing early educational 
dropouts. Secondly, at a young age, and when they are still living with their parents, an apprentice’s pay can 
be lower than that required for older students, and even a small amount of pay compares favourably relative to 
the prospect of not earning anything when attending a full-time school programme. Thirdly, training firms like 
to take in apprentices at a younger age because they can be socialised more easily to the work and to the firm’s 
requirements and realities. Fourthly, working together with adults and being tutored by older apprentices in a 
real-life environment stimulates the learning motivation of young adults and leads to better learning outcomes 
for those who may have problems with self-motivation in a school environment. 
15  Often, 1-to-1 teaching in firms is the standard case, as many training firms only train one apprentice at a time. 
Larger firms usually train more than one apprentice in the same occupation and the same training year and 
have the opportunity to group apprentices where both possible and necessary, which explains why larger firms 
can exploit economies of scale when training apprentices.
Model 1
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In Model 1, the vocational education that apprentices receive at the workplace is not 
a substitute for the general education that is taught in vocational schools.16 Thus, 
the amount of time spent in school remains the same (approximately 1,600 hours), 
but it is now spread over three years. In addition, apprentices receive 600 hours of 
formal vocational instruction at the firm, so that the firm spends approximately 5 
hours of instruction time per apprentice for every week that the apprentice is not in 
school – leading to a total of approximately 2,200 hours of formal instruction time 
over three years. The remainder of the time at the workplace is used for both working 
and practising, thereby providing not only a financial return to the training firm, but 
also a private return for apprentices by acquiring additional on-the-job skills through 
informal learning.
Model 2 targets approximately 18-year-old individuals who already hold a general 
upper-secondary qualification and would, therefore, not need to spend more time 
in general education during an apprenticeship. Thus, apprentices receive only 1,000 
hours of formal (non-general) education in vocational school, and the remaining 600 
hours of formal instruction take place at the firm, leading to a total of 1,600 hours of 
formal education. It is important to note here that, while firms training apprentices in 
Switzerland also believe that an apprentice can either learn while working or is working 
while learning, there are legal obligations in Switzerland for apprentices to receive a 
minimal amount of formal in-firm instruction. The time spent in the firm is, therefore, 
not merely learning by doing. In this spirit, in all three models we calculate, for the 
delegated hours of formal training from schools to firms, the costs of having an in-firm 
trainer spending his or her time educating the apprentices in theory and practical skills. 
Firms are expected to provide their part of the training at their own expense, but at the 
same time, they have the opportunity to train the apprentices in their technologies and 
business processes and thereby save expensive adaptation costs compared with hiring 
someone either directly from school or from the external labour market. As in Model 1, 
apprentices spend the rest of their time at the firm working and practising, thereby not 
only acquiring additional vocational skills through informal learning but also acquiring 
work-related social skills (which are increasingly in demand by firms in today’s labour 
market, cf. Deming 2017). 
Finally, Model 3 is identical to Model 2 in the first two years of training, but it contains an 
additional third year. In Model 2, while apprentices accumulate all the required formal 
human capital in the first two years, relatively little time remains for productive work at 
the firm. Thus, for most occupations (at reasonably high apprentice wages), firms will 
not find Model 2 profitable. Moreover, while apprentices acquire substantial theoretical 
knowledge, firms may want to provide additional general and specific training so 
that their apprentices can successfully perform the required skilled tasks in the firm. 
Therefore, most apprenticeship programmes in the German-speaking countries last 
for at least three years and even for four years (3.5 years in Germany and Austria) in 
16  The 600 hours of general schooling in firms is not equivalent to what a student would acquire when attending 
an upper-secondary school in general education and, therefore, is not enough to qualify to enter a general 
(academic) education programme in higher education. However, given the extensive amount of vocational 
training, the student would certainly qualify for professional education programmes at the level of tertiary 
education. The same is true in the case of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. In Switzerland, for example, 
apprentices have the opportunity to acquire an extra year of general education, either during or after the 
apprenticeship, to acquire a professional baccalaureate. This certification allows students to continue their 
studies at a university of applied sciences. If, however, they want to transfer to a classic, academic university, 
they would have to attend another year of general education.
General education 
in school
Model 2
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practically all the technical occupations in Switzerland. Even if we assume – contrary 
to Swiss apprentices – that Italian apprentices would enter training with an already 
completed general education at the upper-secondary level, two years of vocational 
training would not be enough time to learn the necessary vocational skills and attain the 
performance level of a fully trained skilled worker in skill-intensive occupations if the 
expected skill levels for skilled employees should be comparable to Swiss VET graduates. 
In the additional year that the apprentices spend in training (compared to Model 2), they 
receive the equivalent amount of formal in-firm training as an apprentice in an average 
Swiss firm in a comparable training occupation (approximately 200 hours on average). 
Moreover, an apprentice could work and continue to acquire important vocational and 
professional skills by informal learning for approximately 1,500–1,600 hours in the last 
year of training.
table 1   Assumptions of the baseline simulation models for net training costs in Italy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
three years of training two years of training three years of training
1,600 hours formal education in 
vocational school 
1,000 hours formal education in 
vocational school 
the first two years as in model 2 
approx. five hours per week of 
formal training for each apprentice 
(approx. 600 hours in total) + 
workplace experience
approx. 600 hours of formal 
workplace education + workplace 
experience
in the third year, firms provide 
formal workplace training similar 
to a swiss firm in a comparable 
training occupation (approx. 200 
hours on average)
Total amount of formal school 
and firm training: approx. 2,200 
hours
Total amount of formal school 
and firm training: approx. 1,600 
hours
Total amount of formal school 
and firm training: approx. 1,800 
hours
4.2 Parameters and further assumptions
Apprentice wages
In countries with an apprenticeship tradition, firms pay apprentices’ wages in every 
month of the training period, irrespective of whether the apprentice is working for the 
firm or attending vocational school. Conversely, in countries where work experience 
is viewed as complementary to a predominantly school-based vocational education, 
apprentices are usually only paid for the duration of the time spent as an intern at the 
firm. While being occupied at the firm in the latter form of training mainly serves the 
purpose of acquiring work experience, the wage level during these months is usually also 
higher than the average apprentice’s salary in the classic apprenticeship model. Thus, 
one could consider that the two models of paying apprentices are roughly equivalent, 
meaning that paying less over a longer period equals paying more over a shorter period. 
However, even if the total value in terms of cash payments to the apprentices is the 
same in both payment schemes, there may be important differences not directly related 
to apprentices’ pay.
In particular, paying an apprentice a salary for the whole duration of a training 
programme radically changes the nature of the relationship between the firm and the 
Two models of  
apprentice pay
Monthly pay =  
better matching
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apprentice in many ways. The changed nature of this relationship becomes apparent 
before the apprentice starts working for the firm. When a firm is paying an apprentice 
a monthly salary in each month of the training period, the apprentice is considered to 
be a regular employee. Employees are recruited and hired by firms and not by schools. 
In addition to other benefits, this recruitment has a positive impact on the matching 
of firms and apprentices, both in terms of quality and quantity. In quantitative terms, 
if many school leavers would like to obtain training in occupation A, but firms would 
rather hire apprentices in occupation B, letting the firms recruit apprentices would lead 
to more training in occupation B. Conversely, in a school-driven system, schools would 
have an incentive to offer (too) many training places in occupation A, thus creating a 
mismatch in the labour market later on. Concerning the match quality, allowing firms 
to recruit their apprentices at the beginning of the training period provides incentives 
to firms to pay attention to the individual match and to select suitable candidates from 
the pool of applicants. In the school-driven model, even if there were no mismatch in 
quantitative terms, it may be that the firms would have selected different apprentices 
than those that the schools have allowed into their training programmes. As a result, 
when subsequently confronted with a pool of potential interns, the firms are no 
longer willing to offer internships, despite having vacant training places (for suitable 
candidates). 
Moreover, the fact that the apprentice is responsible to the firm from the moment he 
or she has signed the training (and work) contract is crucial. Even if the apprentice 
spends most of his or her time in school at the beginning of the training period, the 
firm has the right to monitor the educational progress of the apprentice and intervene 
if necessary. For the schools, the employer replaces the parents and becomes the 
main contact person, and employers ensure that the content and quality of the school 
instruction matches their expectations. The employee–employer relationship in this 
type of apprenticeship also has a positive impact on the apprentices’ motivation and 
loyalty to the training company.
Finally, but also important, if the firm pays the apprentice a monthly salary that is 
somewhat lower than that it would pay an intern, the firm also must recognise that 
the apprentice is not at the firm solely to work but is also entitled to receive formal 
instruction and training during the entire training period.
In Switzerland, there is no binding minimum wage, and apprentices are paid irrespective 
of whether they are in the firm – if they are in the firm they receive a monthly wage, 
irrespective of whether they are working or practising. 
We make the following assumptions for our simulation models: 
In the low-wage scenario, we assume that apprentice pay is equal to the average break-
even wage of the three models in the nine occupations in relation to the skilled worker 
wages in the particular occupation. 
The average break-even wage in a particular occupation i is defined as:
wBE,i = (wBE,i + wBE,i + wBE,i)/3
More loyalty and 
motivation
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We then denote the relative break-even wage as the ratio of the average break-even 
wage and the average skilled worker wage in a particular occupation i:
wBE,i = w BE,i / wskilled,i
In a last step, to calculate the wage for the “low-wage” scenario, we calculate the 
average of the relative break-even wages across the nine occupations:
wBE = 1/9 ∑ wBE,i
Depending on the region, we find that the average relative break-even wage is between 
25 % and 30 % of a skilled worker’s wage. This figure is similar to the observed ratio of the 
apprentice wage and the skilled worker wage in Germany and Austria, but considerably 
higher than in Switzerland, where the average relative apprentice pay is around 15 % of 
a skilled worker’s wage, depending on the occupation. Thus, our low-wage scenario can 
be interpreted as a hypothetical setting in which Italian firms would train according 
to a Swiss-style training system but where apprentices receive a wage that is similar 
compared to the German and the Austrian apprenticeship system.
In the high-wage scenario, we assume that the apprentice wage is 50 % of the average 
skilled worker wage in a particular occupation. While this figure is considerably higher 
compared with Germanic apprenticeship systems, it is still considerably lower compared 
to the current minimum apprentice wage in most occupations in Italy. Thus, the goal 
of our simulations is not to mirror the current situation in Italy, but instead to show 
how different wage scenarios would affect a firm’s cost-benefit situation. As discussed 
extensively in Cedefop (2017), changing the apprentice contract from an open-ended to 
a fixed-term contract is a scenario that is currently open for discussion in order to boost 
the number of dual apprenticeship positions in Italy. As we will discuss in the results 
section, it is nearly impossible for a firm to break even at current minimum apprentice 
wages when adopting a Swiss-style apprenticeship model. Therefore, it is important to 
also consider alternative wage scenarios in different contractual settings.
These assumptions lead to the following patterns of apprentices’ wages: In both the low 
and the high-wage model, we define wages in relative terms, meaning that absolute 
apprentice wages differ across occupations – which reflects the current situation in Italy. 
While the low-wage scenario by definition results in occupations that incur net costs and 
others that can generate net benefits because the simulated apprentice wage depends 
on the average break-even wages across all occupations, this is not necessarily the case 
in the high-wage scenario.
Of course, guaranteeing a functioning apprenticeship market not only requires firms to 
break even, but also to be attractive to potential apprentices. Therefore, we decided to 
simulate the impact of these different wage scenarios on the private rates of return to 
training for the apprentices (see chapter 6). 
In Switzerland, individual firms set the apprentices’ pay; therefore, apprentices earn 
very different wages, depending on the firm and the occupation for which they are 
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trained. Apprentice pay may even depend on individual productivity, and many firms 
offer apprentices performance-based salaries (see Backes–Gellner and Oswald 2014). 
Therefore, we complement our analyses with the calculation of break-even salaries. 
The break-even salary corresponds to the salary that a firm would be able to pay 
an apprentice if the goal is to have zero net costs (or net benefit) by the end of the 
training period. Although firms who expect an additional benefit after training could 
even pay a higher wage than the break-even wage, this wage gives a good indication 
of the differences between sectors and occupations and demonstrates that a uniform 
apprentice wage is not efficient, neither in absolute nor in relative terms (relative to the 
occupation specific skilled wage). 
“Fair pay”
Regarding relative wages for apprentices (relative to skilled or unskilled workers), it 
is quite common for legislators and social partners to set arbitrary ratios or absolute 
levels that they consider to be a fair wage.17 The problem with these ratios is that they 
are usually based on the assumption that apprentices primarily work and that learning 
either takes place before the apprenticeship or is just learning by doing. In other words, 
so-called “fair pay” assumes that firms do not have extra training expenditures. In 
doing so, legislators and social partners often overlook the fact that setting ratios in 
this way actually forces firms that are interested in training apprentices to reduce their 
training expenditures to a minimum. Therefore, we propose calculating “fair pay” as the 
relative wage that a firm can pay an apprentice conditional to the expenditures that the 
firm must make to ensure high standards of training. These wage levels correspond to 
the break-even wages that we have simulated for all scenarios, models and occupations. 
Performance levels (relative productivity)
The advantage of our simulation model is that we do not have to assume that the 
productivity levels are the same in Italy and in Switzerland – even though the 
occupations for which we use Swiss data are very similar to the Italian occupations. 
Using the relative level of productivity of Swiss apprentices to Swiss skilled workers as 
an indication of the learning progress of Italian apprentices merely assumes that Italian 
firms would be able to train their apprentices in such a way that they would progress 
in relation to Italian expectations (i.e. the productivity level of skilled workers in Italy), 
just as is in the case in Switzerland. The relative measure also has the advantage that 
differences in productivity between either firms or regions that are reflected in the 
differences in salaries for skilled labour are taken into account through the salary 
level. Firms operating at lower productivity levels can only afford to pay lower salaries; 
consequently, the benefit of the work of an apprentice in monetary terms is also lower. 
However, we assume – as observed in the Swiss, German, and Austrian data – that the 
apprentices reach comparable levels of relative productivity, irrespective of the absolute 
level of productivity in a given firm or occupation (Dionisious et al., 2009; Moretti et 
al., 2017). In other words, a firm trains apprentices with the aim of reaching the same 
productivity level with that apprentice as the firm has with a skilled worker.
17  In Germany the new government is currently discussing the introduction of a national minimum apprentice 
wage that is substantially above the going wage levels. The current minimum apprentice wages are subject to 
collective bargaining agreements at the sector level and may differ across regions.
The “right” salary
Using relative 
productivity
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Although the differences in absolute productivity between Swiss and Italian firms in 
the same economic sector are not important for our calculations, we need to address 
one potential source of bias. A bias can occur if the competition between the school 
system and the apprenticeship system is such that the school system has an advantage 
in attracting the more talented and more highly motivated students, thereby leaving 
the apprenticeship training system with the less talented and less motivated students. 
In such a situation, firms may decide not to train at all, wait for the students to leave 
college or university, and then offer them an internship instead of a formal dual 
training programme.18 For firms that still wish to offer a dual programme to the 
available applicants, such a situation would generate higher net costs, because either 
the productivity levels of the apprentices would be lower than the comparable Swiss 
situation, or firms would have to spend more money on internal training to reach 
comparable productivity levels – or both (see for example Muehlemann et al., 2013). In 
other words, we base our calculations on the assumption that Italian firms would be able 
to attract apprentices into their programmes who are similarly able to those attracted 
by Swiss firms today.
Thus, for the three-year programmes (Models 1 and 3), we assume that the levels of 
relative productivity exactly correspond to the levels observed in similar three-year 
programmes in Switzerland. In Model 2, we calculate a lower threshold for the net 
costs of training and assume that the progress in relative productivity between year 1 
and year 2 corresponds to the progress made by a Swiss apprentice between year 2 and 
year 3 of the training period. One argument that could support this assumption is that, 
unlike Swiss apprentices, the typical Italian apprentice in these programmes would have 
already graduated from upper-secondary school.
Given that the true level of productivity of apprentices in Italy is not only difficult to 
forecast, there would also be a natural and probably considerable heterogeneity between 
apprentices and training firms, we always complement our simulations with sensitivity 
checks on different levels of relative productivity of apprentices. Thus, we can at least 
simulate whether deviations from our parameters that correspond to the Swiss averages 
would lead to sizeable changes in the net costs of training.
Dropout rates
In many countries, firms face high dropout rates, mainly due to a negative selection 
of students for work-based training programmes, but sometimes also because of 
either the poor quality or the bad reputation of programmes, firms face high dropout 
rates. Dropouts can also be a consequence of the duration of training programmes. If a 
long duration is not necessary to acquire the skills required to be a professional in the 
occupation, apprentices have a higher tendency to drop out prematurely. These dropouts 
may have a negative impact on the firms’ willingness to provide future training places, 
not only because of the cost to their reputation, but also because firms cannot recoup 
their training investments if apprentices drop out too early. To calculate the potential 
additional costs of providing training places caused by dropouts, we simulate the impact 
of dropout rates of 25 % and 50 % of apprentices after the first year of the programme. In 
other words, if training one apprentice successfully in the full programme also means 
18  Based on the discussion in our workshops with industry representatives, such a situation is currently observed 
for the application developer/software engineer occupations in the south of Italy.
Potential biases
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training an additional apprentice unsuccessfully for one year, the potential costs of this 
additional apprentice must either be added to the costs for the successful apprentice 
or, in the case of net benefits, be deducted from the net benefits. The reason we are 
writing about potential costs is because dropouts generate additional costs only in 
programmes where apprentices cause net costs in the first year of training. If, however, 
the training scheme allows the firm to cover the training investments very quickly with 
the productive contribution of the apprentices, dropouts might even increase the net 
benefit (reduce the net costs) of the overall programme. Although, in the latter case, 
the firm has an incentive to discontinue the training if problems arise, the firm would 
still face the reputational costs of high dropout rates, which, in turn, would reduce the 
chances of attracting good apprentices in the first place. 
Other expenditures
In addition to training expenditure and other personnel costs, as well as the apprentices’ 
salaries, firms that train apprentices also incur other costs e.g. for tools, materials, 
and machinery, that they have to buy either for the purpose of training or that are not 
used exclusively for production when being used by apprentices for training. While 
personnel costs and apprentices’ wages can be calculated using Italian wage data, 
expenditure for tools or machinery in Switzerland are difficult to transfer to the Italian 
context because the price level is different between the two countries. Therefore, we 
assume that the remaining expenditure, other than personnel costs and apprentices’ 
salaries, correspond to the same share of these costs in terms of a skilled worker’s 
salary in Switzerland. Although there is a certain amount of uncertainty attached to 
this assumption, the impact on our simulations is limited, as personnel costs and 
apprentices’ wages already constitute between 85 % and 90 % of the total gross costs of 
training in Switzerland. 
Costs for off-site education and training
In the German-speaking countries, off-site training and education is usually provided 
by public schools and fully paid for by the state. In other words, firms do not face 
direct costs for the education and training provided by schools but must, of course, 
factor in additional absences of apprentices from the workplace, which means less 
time for productive work for the firm. For this reason, it is not always clear ex ante 
if the training and education provided free by schools either decreases or increases 
the net costs of training for firms. As a rule of thumb, one can say that, if the training 
provided (free) by schools had to be provided in any case to attain the expected levels 
of skills and productivity, the public provision would lower the net costs of training for 
firms. However, if some or much of the content learned in school does not translate 
immediately to higher productivity of the apprentices, the additional absences from 
the workplace create additional net training costs for the firm. Because of the complex 
interplay of factors, one can easily understand why firms in countries with well-
developed apprenticeship systems sometimes resist the transfer of training and 
education to off-site providers, while, in other instances, they lobby for more training 
and education to be taken over by publicly financed schools.
Similar to Switzerland
Public provision of 
school-based education
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To make the simulations comparable not only with all the countries for which we are 
conducting simulations, but also with the empirical data collected in Austria, Germany, 
and Switzerland, we assume that off-site education is paid for by the government and 
that the training firms do not have to cover any additional costs for this part of the 
training programme. 
4.3 Data 
We use three major sources for the data in our simulations. 
The first source is the most recent cost-benefit survey data from Switzerland (see 
Strupler & Wolter, 2012), which collected data on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship 
training from a representative set of approximately 2,500 Swiss training firms. This 
study was the third to be conducted within one decade in Switzerland (see Schweri et 
al., 2003 and Muehlemann et al., 2007 for previous results), and the results remained 
remarkably stable over the business cycle. 
This source is used to obtain all the necessary data regarding the following investments 
in training and the productive contributions of apprentices: the weekly number of 
training hours that a firm invests per apprentice; the number of hours spent by other 
personnel (such as HR services) involved in hiring and training apprentices; the 
proportion of unproductive time spent by apprentices in the firm (mainly used for 
practice); the number of hours apprentices substitute for unskilled workers while in 
the firm; the number of hours apprentices substitute for skilled workers while in the 
firm; the productivity levels in a given year of training relative to skilled workers in 
the same occupation; and, finally, the amount of money invested in material, tools and 
machinery and other expenditure related to apprenticeship training. All the relevant 
data are averages for Swiss firms training apprentices either in the same occupation or 
in the occupation that is most similar to the Italian occupation. 
The second data source is Italian wage data for the economic sectors and occupations 
for which we run our simulations in Italy.19 To calculate the productive contribution of 
the apprentices, we used the average wages of skilled workers in the same occupation in 
addition to the wages earned by young unskilled workers in the same economic sector. 
In some sectors, the reported data show that currently, an average unskilled worker 
earns almost as much or, sometimes, as much as an average skilled worker in the same 
economic sector. The most likely explanation for this result is a difference in years of 
tenure between an average older unskilled worker and a younger skilled worker. In our 
simulations, when calculating the productive contribution of an apprentice performing 
unskilled labour, we assume that the value of this work is equal to what a firm would 
have to pay a young unskilled worker hired today from the labour market. Given that the 
unemployment rate of young people in Italy is high, such an assumption seems justified.
As for training and personnel expenditure, we used the salary data for skilled workers 
in the training occupation, in addition to other categories of workers (such as HR 
personnel) involved in either the training or the management of apprentices.
19  Wage information was kindly provided by the Foundation Giacomo Brodolini based on the Italian Labour Force 
Survey 2015.
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We collected data on hiring costs, as there are no Italian data available on the hiring 
costs of new workers. As the labour market situation differs considerably between 
Switzerland and Italy, we were also not able to use existing Swiss data for this purpose. 
The data were collected at the end of each sectorial workshop (by means of a pencil and 
paper questionnaire) as well as by means of an online survey. While the results are not 
representative for Italy because we could not apply a random sampling strategy, we 
obtained a sufficiently high number of responses that allows for a more detailed analysis 
of hiring costs in Italy, which we provide in Chapter 5.20 
The degree to which a firm can save on hiring costs per trained apprentice depends 
on many factors, such as the labour market situation for apprentices who finish the 
program, the loyalty of apprentices to the training firm, and the in-house opportunities 
for apprentices. The experiences in Austria, Germany and Switzerland show that larger 
firms with internal labour markets have higher takeover rates than small firms. Large 
firms typically required more firm-specific knowledge and can therefore expect higher 
savings in hiring costs.
20  Except for the occupation waitresses/waiters, we received a sufficient number of responses to provide 
estimates for hiring costs for the remaining 8 occupations in our project.
Hiring costs
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5  Simulating net training costs –  
a detailed analysis
In this chapter, we illustrate the simulations of the costs and benefits of various 
training models in detail for the occupation of a commercial bank employee and provide 
additional descriptive statistics. We present all detailed results of the other eight 
training occupations (but without further explanations) in the appendix.
1.  We estimate the net training costs for all three baseline models, as outlined in the 
previous chapter (Chapter 4) for this occupation. 
2.  We provide a sensitivity analysis regarding the productivity of apprentices relative 
to skilled workers at the beginning of an apprenticeship. Thus, we show how the net 
training costs change when we allow for different assumptions of the productivity 
parameter. 
3.  We present a break-even analysis for apprentice wages, showing at what level of monthly 
apprentice’s pay a firm could offer apprenticeship training at zero net costs, and also in 
relative terms compared to the skilled worker wage in the training occupation. 
4.  We discuss how net costs vary by firm size, as large firms typically offer higher wages, 
particularly for skilled workers. 
5. We show how different dropout rates affect the net costs of training. 
Net training costs for apprentices 
When looking at the results for the three baseline models (see Table 2) with two 
different apprentice wage scenarios, it immediately becomes clear that, from the firm’s 
perspective, net training costs vary greatly not only due to the different apprentice 
wages but also between the different scenarios. In the high-wage scenario in Model 3, 
net training costs are higher than € 30,000. Conversely, a firm can expect to generate a 
net benefit of around € 3500 from training an apprentice according to the same Model 3 in 
the low-wage scenario. Thus, setting apprentice pay at 50 % of skilled worker pay (high-
wage scenario) compared to about 25 % (low-wage scenario) adds an extra 12,000 euros 
to the yearly apprentice wage bill. As the skilled worker salary of a trained commercial 
bank employee is clearly among the highest in Italy, the difference between the low-
wage and the high-wage scenario is more pronounced compared to other occupations.21 
21  In reality, we might expect that higher wages could attract better qualified candidates. In our simulations, 
however, we assume that the qualification level of a candidate remains stable (i.e. corresponds to the average 
qualification level of a Swiss apprentice).
Chapter overview
Pay level matters most
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The differences in net training costs between training models, however, require a more 
detailed explanation. As the training duration in Model 2 is only two years, the net costs 
are typically much higher compared to Model 3, where training lasts three years. In 
particular, because apprentices are not absent from the workplace in the third year and 
already have a relatively high productivity, the benefit of their productive work clearly 
outweighs the training costs and therefore allows the firm to recoup at least part of their 
initial training investment.
However, the results from the high-wage scenario clearly show that whether Model 3 
is more beneficial than Model 2 also depends on the level of apprentice wages. In the 
case of the commercial bank employee, the apprentice’s productivity is simply not high 
enough to cover the apprentice wage costs in addition to the costs for workplace training 
(as highly paid instructors also make training more expensive). Thus, for Model 3 to yield 
sufficient benefits, it is important to ensure that apprentice salaries are not set at too 
high a level. Otherwise, a longer training duration simply translates into higher losses 
for the company.
table 2  Net training costs – Commercial bank employee – Italy
Wage level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
low 8,241 4,419 –3,486
high 43,537 27,950 31,810
source: own calculations
Our survey results show that firms training commercial bank employees face substantial 
hiring costs when hiring externally. Besides the usual recruitment costs, the hiring firm 
also incurs costs due to lost productivity during the adaptation period (i.e. until a new hire 
becomes fully productive), and disruption costs because incumbent employees provide 
informal training to new hires. In Switzerland, an average firm across all occupations 
faces hiring costs of about 4 monthly salaries of a skilled worker (Muehlemann and 
Strupler Leiser 2018). In Italy, however, hiring costs tend to be even higher, but there 
is a large variation across occupations. For commercial bank employees, the results of 
our survey indicate that hiring costs amount to 8.6 months of a skilled worker’s salary 
(Table 3), or about 29,000 euros.
table 3  Hiring costs – Commercial bank employee – Italy
Hiring costs Search costs Adaptation costs Disruption costs
8.6 months of a skilled 
worker’s salary
8.4 % 74.5 % 17.1 %
source: own calculations
The data for hiring costs reveal, similarly to Switzerland, that the search cost 
component is typically the least important component of hiring costs. As new hires, 
even when qualified in terms of the educational requirements, also need to acquire 
firm-specific knowledge and familiarize themselves with the work environment during 
the onboarding process, the initial adaptation period until a new hire becomes fully 
productive results in substantial costs for the hiring firm. Conversely, when retaining 
a former apprentice, such costs typically no longer arise or are kept to a minimum. 
Substantial potential 
savings in hiring costs due 
to apprenticeship training
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Moreover, incumbent workers often need to provide instruction to new external hires, 
which leads to disruption costs (due to incumbent workers not being able to carry out 
their regular tasks). In relative terms, adaptation costs are the most important hiring 
cost component in all occupations in our study, but the relative importance varies to 
some extent across the different occupations. For commercial bank employees (Table 3), 
search costs account for only 8.4 % of hiring costs, whereas the remainder is due to 
adaptation costs (74.5 %) and disruption costs (17.1 %).
Thus, to the extent that training firms were able to retain apprentices after training, and if 
subsequent turnover rates did not exceed those of external hires, then all training models 
(except for Model 1 in the high-wage scenario) became profitable or close to the break-
even point when taking a longer-term perspective that also incorporates future savings 
on hiring costs. However, it also becomes evident that if firms faced high turnover rates 
of apprentices after training, these additional benefits would disappear immediately.
Net training costs also change by the year of training (Figure 1): in the first and second 
year, training costs clearly exceed the benefit, but in the third year, net costs are almost 
zero. The main reason why net costs decrease is the corresponding increase in the value 
of productive tasks because apprentices become more productive in skilled work. It 
should also be noted that apprentice wages are constant in our simulations, while in 
Switzerland apprentice wages are structured so that they increase during the course of 
an apprenticeship programme. An advantage of such a wage structure is that net costs 
are lower in the beginning of an apprenticeship (thereby reducing the costs for the 
training firm when dropouts occur), and also correlate with an apprentice’s productivity 
(possibly having a positive effect on an apprentice’s motivation). 
figure 1   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – 
Commercial bank employees – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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Instruction time at the workplace, another important cost component, is assumed to be 
constant across the different years of training. The reason for this assumption lies in 
the observation that the instruction time in Swiss firms varies very little in the different 
years of an apprenticeship programme.
As apprentices become more experienced in difficult tasks usually performed by skilled 
workers, firms also allocate a higher fraction of such tasks to apprentices (relative to 
unskilled tasks). Figure 2 shows the composition of training benefits by training year 
stemming from apprentices substituting skilled and unskilled workers. While almost all 
the training benefits in the first year of training are due to low-skilled tasks, only about 
30 % of training benefits result from low-skilled tasks in the third year of training. Thus, 
as apprentices become more productive in skilled tasks, firms also allocate more time 
for apprentices to carry out skilled rather than unskilled tasks.
Nonetheless, when high-skilled tasks are very difficult to perform, the productivity of 
the apprentices is initially very low compared to experienced skilled workers. Moreover, 
if the wage levels for unskilled workers is close to that of skilled workers, then the share 
of the monetary benefits accruing from low-skilled work may still surpass that from 
high-skilled work in the short term, even if the firm uses apprentices predominantly 
for skilled activities.
figure 2   Composition of training benefits by year of training – Commercial bank 
employees – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario).
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figure 3  Composition of gross training costs – Commercial bank employees – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario).
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Regarding the components of the gross training costs, Figure 3 shows that most training 
costs are in fact wage costs for apprentices and training instructors. In the case of Model 
1, apprentice wage costs account for 56 % of total training costs. Conversely, the costs 
for instruction at the workplace amount to 28 % of total training costs, leaving less 
than 20 % for other expenditure, such as infrastructure or materials used for training 
purposes. The respective proportions are very similar for Model 2 and Model 3, and also 
correspond closely to the results obtained for Swiss training firms (Strupler and Wolter 
2012).
Sensitivity analysis of apprentice productivity
The purpose of training for the apprentices is to be hired as skilled workers at the 
end of their training period by either the training firm or an outside firm. In order to 
learn the necessary skills, they must not only follow a theoretical education but also 
be able to practise their newly acquired skills during training. The benefit created for 
the firm by letting apprentices substitute for skilled workers depends crucially on the 
relative performance (productivity) of apprentices compared to skilled workers. As we 
cannot directly measure the productivity of Italian apprentices, we use the levels of 
productivity of Swiss apprentices in our calculations. Thus, our estimates rely on the 
assumption that the relative productivity of apprentices in skilled tasks compared to 
experienced skilled workers (but not the absolute levels of productivity) would be the 
same for Italian and Swiss apprentices. This might be a good assumption to start with, 
but there are many reasons why in the real case of introducing a Swiss apprenticeship 
model in Italy, we would not see exactly the same levels of relative productivity. 
Therefore, it is necessary to run sensitivity analyses in order to see by how much the 
net costs or net benefits of training would change if we deviated (+/- 10 percentage 
Cost components
Sensitivity checks
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points in the first year of training22) from the Swiss assumptions about the relative 
productivity levels of apprentices.
figure 4   Sensitivity analysis of apprentice productivity – Commercial bank employees 
– Italy
Source: own calculations (low-wage scenario)
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The net costs change similarly to changes in the assumption about the relative 
productivity of apprentices across the different training models (Figure 4). The 
changes, however, are not very large: increasing the relative productivity of an 
apprentice by 10 percentage points (e.g. from 30 % to 40 % compared to that of a skilled 
worker) by € 1,200 in Model 2, but only by about € 600 in Models 1 and 3. Net costs in 
Model 2 react somewhat more sensitively to changes in the assumption about the 
relative productivity of apprentices because we assume that, due to prior education and 
the advanced age, firms replace skilled workers with apprentices more quickly, and 
apprentices in turn begin to work at higher levels of productivity faster. Nonetheless, 
even for Model 2, the results are not affected very strongly by changes in the relative 
productivity parameters.
Break-even analysis for apprentice pay
The break-even analysis illustrates the linear relation between the apprentice’s monthly 
wage and the firm’s net training costs, holding all other factors constant. The break-even 
analysis serves to show the salary level at which a firm would just have zero net costs 
in training apprentices. Additionally, it also helps to understand the average amount 
by which apprentice pay would have to be increased or reduced if additional benefits or 
costs accrued, although they are currently not included in our model. Technically, a € 1 
22  In Model 1 and 3 with a training duration of three years, we also change the second-year relative productivity 
by +/- 5 percentage points.
Break-even monthly 
pay lies between € 500 
and € 800
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increase in the monthly apprentice wage leads to a € 36 increase in net costs for Models 1 
and 3 (36 months of training), while it increases net costs by € 24 in Model 2 (24 months 
of training). Thus, apprentice pay is a decisive factor for a firm’s cost-benefit ratio, and 
net training costs are highly sensitive to how we set apprentice pay.
The calculation of the break-even wage (Figure 5) shows that net training costs would 
be zero for monthly apprentice wages between € 500 (Model 1) and € 800 (Model 3). 
Although these break-even wages are substantially lower than current (minimum) 
apprentice wages in Italy, the fact that our simulations are relevant for a scenario 
where apprentices sign a training contract that is automatically terminated at the end 
of their training has to be taken into account. Thus, to the extent that apprenticeship 
training is supposed to attract a substantial number of firms, such a contractual setting 
is probably important, because not all firms may want to retain apprentices after 
training. In Switzerland, almost two thirds of apprentices leave the training firm within 
a year after training. Similarly, in Germany the retention rate is higher but still about 
40 % of apprentices leave the training firm within a year after training. Therefore, it is 
important that particularly small training firms can break even (or come close to break-
even point) by the end of training, because otherwise they are unlikely to participate in 
the apprenticeship training system, as is currently the case in Italy.
figure 5  Break-even analysis of apprentice wage – Commercial bank employees – Italy
Source: own calculations
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In relation to unskilled and skilled wages, break-even wages are between 15 % and 33 % 
for each category (Figure 6). One can see from the calculations that, even relative to 
unskilled wages, break-even wages would need to be substantially below these wage 
levels for firms to be able to pay for their training expenditure. Taking into account 
the reflections on ‘fair pay’ (see Chapter 4, assumptions on wages), this is, however, 
not surprising. Even if we excluded any training expenditure by the firms, ‘fair pay’ for 
an apprentice relative to a skilled worker would need to take into account four factors 
Break-even pay is below 
the minimum apprentice 
wage
Break-even pay relative 
to skilled and unskilled 
wages
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that push the ratio down. Firstly, an apprentice is not always working because he/she 
spends some time in off-site schooling. Secondly, when the apprentice is at the firm, 
he/she is not always working but also needs ‘unproductive’ time to practise. Thirdly, 
when working, the apprentice is also doing unskilled work that would be remunerated 
at a lower pay level and, most importantly, when substituting a skilled worker, the 
apprentice works at an average at a productivity level that is significantly lower 
compared to a skilled worker. The four factors taken together easily explain why the 
break-even wages even in the best case (Model 3) do not surpass 25 % of an average wage 
for a qualified commercial bank employees.
figure 6   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled wages 
– Commercial bank employees – Italy
Source: own calculations
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Wage structure within a firm – how net costs differ by firm size
While apprentice pay is an important cost component, the wage structure for low- 
and high-skilled workers also strongly affects the value of an apprentice´s productive 
contribution (the benefit side). The value of having an apprentice work productively for 
one hour in an unskilled or skilled activity corresponds to the unskilled or skilled wage 
(adjusted for the relative productivity of the apprentice, as discussed in Chapter 4) for a 
worker of that particular firm. Thus, the higher the pay for unskilled and skilled workers, 
the more beneficial it is for a firm to use the trainee for productive work (all other things 
remaining equal23). Firms differ not only by wage levels (which reflect differences in the 
overall productivity of the firm) but often also in respect to the ratio between unskilled 
23  A firm’s provision of workplace training may depend on the firm size for various reasons and not only because 
of levels and differences between unskilled and skilled wages. Looking at the Swiss data, we find that the 
differences in the training hours provided to apprentices do not vary much by firm size, and this lack of 
variation is the reason why we assume in the simulations that all other factors besides the wage structure 
remain constant across firm sizes. 
Firm size can matter
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and skilled worker pay. Hence, the latter also determines a firm’s optimal allocation of 
skilled and unskilled tasks to an apprentice.
To illustrate this in detail, let us consider the extreme and hypothetical case where 
unskilled and skilled wages are equal. In that scenario, a firm that wants to minimise 
net training costs has an incentive to allocate as few skilled tasks as possible to the 
apprentice, because the productivity of an apprentice in skilled tasks is lower compared 
to a skilled worker, while an apprentice – by definition – is assumed to be equally 
productive in unskilled tasks compared to an unskilled worker. However, if unskilled 
pay is much lower than skilled pay, then a profit-maximizing firm has an incentive to 
allocate skilled tasks to apprentices early on, so that their productivity in these tasks 
increases faster. Again, let us consider an extreme case where the productivity of an 
apprentice in the last year of training is equal to that of a skilled worker. In this case, 
the firm’s benefit from having the apprentice carry out the skilled tasks is simply the 
difference in hourly pay between the skilled worker and the apprentice, and by assuming 
that the skilled wage is higher than the unskilled wage, a firm will no longer have an 
incentive to use apprentices for unskilled tasks.
Looking at the Italian wage data, we observe that the wage level in small firms is 
generally lower than in large firms, as is the case in almost all countries. Moreover, the 
differences between skilled and unskilled pay may change across firm size categories. 
While unskilled workers also earn more in large firms compared to small firms, the 
magnitude of the firm size wage premium differs by the qualification level across the 
different occupations.
As we assume in our simulations that firms pay the same apprentice pay irrespective of 
their size, observed differences in our simulated net costs arise due to wage differences 
of unskilled and skilled workers. A change in wages has ambiguous effects. As outlined 
above, higher skilled and unskilled wages increase the value of the allocation of 
productive tasks to apprentices. However, an increase in skilled worker pay increases 
training costs, because each hour of instruction time becomes more costly. Thus, 
depending on the amount of training provided at the workplace and on the extent to 
which apprentice are used in the production process, an increase in skilled worker 
wages can have a positive or a negative effect on net training costs. For commercial bank 
employees, the results show that the differences across firm sizes are very small (see 
Figure 7). However, in other occupations we find at times considerable differences in net 
training costs across firm size categories (see Appendix). 
It is important to note that in reality, bigger firms often pay higher apprentice salaries 
than small firms, which affects net training costs (but possibly also facilitates the 
recruitment of suitable apprentices).
Incentives to use 
apprentices for  
skilled tasks
Skills premium higher  
for big firms
Expected net benefits do 
not differ much between 
firms of different sizes
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figure 7  Net costs by firm size – Commercial bank employees – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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Small firms typically face a higher risk of being unable to retain their apprentices after 
the training period (or may have no vacancies to fill) and therefore cannot factor in 
additional benefits after training, or only to a lesser degree. Conversely, very small firms 
would need to adhere to the low pay scenario if they do not want to risk losing money by 
training apprentices. Although big firms could easily run a Swiss-type apprenticeship 
model given the Italian wage structure, micro-firms would have difficulty doing so.24
Finally, we analyse what impact apprentice dropouts would have on the net costs of 
training of one successful apprentice after the first year of training. Figure 8 compares 
our basic scenario with a zero-dropout rate to calculations where every fourth (25 %) or 
every second (50 %) apprentice would quit the training programme after the first year for 
Model 1 with low pay and for training Model 2 with high pay. Since in our simulations the 
training firm faces net costs after the first year, such dropout rates would increase the 
overall net costs per successful apprentice. Across the different models, a 50 % dropout 
rate would increase the net costs for successful training of an apprentice by roughly 50 % 
(because net costs are almost identical in the first two years of training, and close to zero 
in the third year, as shown in Figure 1). Thus, paying a lower apprentice salary in the first 
year of training (with a corresponding increase in the second and third year of training) 
would clearly reduce dropout costs from the firm’s perspective.
24 We call SMEs with less than 10 employees ‘micro-firms’.
Micro firms may face 
more difficulties
Dropouts increase 
the net costs
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figure 8   Changes in net costs assuming different dropout rates – Commercial bank 
employees – Italy
Source: own calculations
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Besides the financial costs that dropouts generate for training firms, there would 
certainly also be a negative psychological factor affecting the willingness to train and, 
as mentioned before, damage to the firm’s reputation to take into account.
Reputational risks
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6  Setting apprentice wages and potential 
effects on training quality
There are two basic options when it comes to setting minimum apprentice wages: firstly, 
apprentice wages may be set at a certain absolute level that applies to all apprenticeship 
occupations. In our simulation results for Spain (Wolter and Muehlemann 2014) we 
followed such a strategy, also because minimum wages for young people in Spain were 
set as absolute minimum wages, although they can differ from region to region.25 
Similarly, because of a national youth minimum wage in England that comes close to 
break-even wages or sometimes would even be higher than break-even wages, we have 
also used absolute wages in the simulations for English firms (Wolter and Joho 2018). 
Conversely, in Italy minimum wages are set at the sector level, so there are differences 
across the nine occupations for which we simulate net training costs. For that reason, 
we assume that apprentice wages are a certain fraction of the skilled worker wages in 
the corresponding occupations. In the low-wage scenario, that fraction was about 25 % 
(the average break-even wage), whereas it was 50 % of a skilled worker’s salary in our 
high-wage scenario.
Figure 9 illustrates that choosing an absolute (for reasons of illustration, we assume a 
wage of 530 euros per month, which corresponds to the high-wage scenario of Wolter 
and Muehlemann 2014), rather than a relative apprentice pay setting (25 % of skilled 
worker pay) can strongly influence the outcomes with regard to net training costs, 
but the direction of that change must not be the same for all cases. In the occupation 
shop salesperson, the absolute and relative apprentice wages are quite similar, and as 
a result the net costs do not change much. In the occupation waitresses/waiters, the 
effect is already larger because the relative apprentice wage is significantly lower than 
530 euros. The most striking consequence is observed in the occupation application 
developer and software engineer, because skilled worker wages are very high. As a 
result, apprentice wages as a fraction of skilled worker salaries are considerably higher 
than 530 euros, adding up to a difference in net training costs of 12,000 euros over 
a three-year apprenticeship programme. Thus, a consequence of setting apprentice 
wages at an absolute level (in euros) rather than as a percentage of skilled worker 
wages in a particular occupation is that the rank of occupations in terms of net training 
costs can change if there are large differences in skilled worker salaries across training 
occupations. In the cases illustrated here, the move from relative salaries to absolute 
salaries would increase the net costs for two occupations, while reducing the net costs 
substantially for the third occupation. 
25  In particular, we made simulations for a low-wage model with 300 euros monthly apprentice wages, and a 
high-wage scenario where apprentice wages were set at 530 euros (which was the minimum wage for youths 
in Catalonia).
Absolute vs. relative 
minimum apprentice 
wages
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figure 9   Net costs size for absolute and relative apprentice salaries – three selected 
occupations – Italy
Source: own calculations
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While our aim, as previously stated, is not to assess the current cost-benefit situation in 
Italy, we nevertheless provide an analysis in this chapter of how net costs change when 
we use actual minimum wages for apprentices in Italy.26 As actual minimum apprentice 
wages yield net training costs that are often higher compared to our high-wage scenario, 
we provide a simulation of how firms could reduce training costs even if they have to pay 
minimum wages to their apprentices (Figure 10). 
Simulation 1 calculates net training costs for a scenario where firms have to pay 
apprentices a wage corresponding to the relevant Italian minimum apprentice wage. 
As illustrated in Figure 10, such a scenario results in substantial net costs for all 
occupations. 
Simulation 2 is a scenario in which firms would react to the high net costs by deciding 
not to provide training at the workplace longer and therefore also dispense with any 
practise time. However, as a consequence of reducing the training at the workplace, 
we have to further assume that the relative productivity of apprentices is 50 % of the 
relative productivity used in Simulation 1, where we use the respective values from 
Swiss training companies. This assumption reflects the fact that apprentices still learn 
because they receive formal training at the school, but that they accumulate skills much 
more slowly compared to a situation in which they also receive formal training at the 
workplace.
Simulation 3 additionally assumes that while at the workplace, apprentices spend all of 
their time with simple tasks that are usually allocated to unskilled employees. The firms 
26  The relevant minimum wages for apprentices in the corresponding occupations were kindly provided by the 
Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini.
How firms could decrease 
training quality as a 
reaction to high net 
training costs
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realize that the progress and the levels of productivity of the apprentices (assumptions in 
Simulation 2) are too low to generate a satisfactory added value when doing skilled work, 
and therefore decide to use the apprentices only to substitute for unskilled labour. Thus, 
in this case apprentices are exploited as cheap labour and do not have the opportunity 
to acquire occupational skills by means of formal training or informal learning at the 
workplace. In this case, learning takes place only at the school. 
The results show that the substantial net costs observed in Simulation 1, with a highest 
value of almost 50,000 euros for the occupation mechanical technicians, could be reduced 
considerably by applying the decisions that underlie the assumptions in Simulations 
2 and 3. For some occupations, the elimination of formal training at the workplace 
already reduces the net costs substantially e.g. in the case of application developers 
and software engineers, whereas for other occupations, like bricklayers and shop 
salespersons, the impact would be smaller. However, the switch from using apprentices 
to substitute for skilled workers to a policy under which apprentices would be solely used 
to substitute for unskilled workers would produce substantial reductions in the net costs 
for all occupations. This is the result of the fact that when the relative productivity of 
apprentices falls because of the lack of formal training at the workplace, the added value 
provided by the work of apprentices when substituting skilled workers falls below the 
value added when apprentices replace unskilled workers. To sum up, the simulations 
show that firms could reduce net training costs drastically by not offering training 
or learning opportunities at the workplace, even when forced to pay the minimum 
apprentice wage. Or in other words, firms that are forced to pay minimum wages that lie 
substantially above break-even wages have an incentive to cut training expenditures and 
make changes in the use of apprentices in the production process in order to reduce the 
expected net costs of training and thereby would automatically impair training quality. 
figure 10   Net costs for differing scenarios for intensive training in the firm simulations based on Model 1 – Italy
Source: own calculations
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The implications of our simulations are that it is important to not only establish training 
curricula that specify what skills apprentices need to acquire at the workplace, but also 
to ensure that monitoring agencies are in place to enforce firms’ compliance with the 
training regulations. As our results in Figure 10 show, training firms clearly would have 
financial incentives to reduce the training quality when net costs are too high (if all 
firms did not refrain from participation in the apprenticeship system in the first place).
Monitoring agencies are 
necessary to enforce 
training quality
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7  Results of a simulation of private rates  
of return to education for apprentices
Observing that some wage scenarios (low, high, and break-even) assume apprenticeship 
wages that are only a relatively small fraction of unskilled and skilled wages, a 
question arises as to whether training is worthwhile for the apprentices at such levels 
of apprentice pay. The lower the pay during the training period, and the longer the 
duration of the apprenticeship programme, the higher the wage differential between 
the unskilled and the skilled wage must be for the rest of the apprentice’s working life 
to generate a positive return to education. Given that apprentices in Italy start their 
training much later compared to countries like Switzerland and Germany, the wage 
aspect of apprenticeship training is also much more important.
Although we are using real labour market data on Italian wages in this study, we need 
to simulate these rates of return to education because these calculations should mirror 
our assumptions in the cost-benefit simulations for firms. In other words, we need to 
simulate whether apprentices can expect positive returns to education if they follow an 
apprenticeship as designed in our models and are paid the apprentice wage as assumed 
in the cost-benefit simulations for firms. The results shown in Table 4 use the break-
even wages calculated for all models and occupations. In the break-even scenario, firms 
would not incur net costs after training and would therefore not need to rely on additional 
benefits after training. Thus, it is most interesting to see whether scenarios that are 
attractive for firms to offer apprenticeships are also attractive for potential apprentices.
For the calculations of the rates of return to education for apprentices, we need to make 
some additional assumptions. Firstly, the alternative wage for a young person who 
chooses to forgo an apprenticeship would be the wage for an unskilled employee in the 
same economic sector as the apprenticeship. A stronger assumption, however, is that 
we use the current wage levels of skilled people as the expected wages after training. 
We chose to use this assumption as a lower threshold for our calculations, presuming 
that a student facing the decision to start an apprenticeship does not use the current 
wage levels observed for trained workers as the benchmark in his/her decision process. 
We could, of course, assume that if Italian apprentices were trained similarly to Swiss 
apprentices, their levels of productivity would increase compared to workers in the 
same occupations in Italy today and they would earn a skill premium. For the firms – 
as described above – changes in the assumptions influencing the impact of training on 
skilled wages do not alter the net costs of training much, whereas for the apprentices, 
such increases would translate directly into higher rates of return to education. 
However, we cannot know the amount by which the productivity of apprentices would 
rise in reality, or how such increases would translate into higher salaries for skilled 
workers. For these reasons, we chose to adhere to the conservative assumption that, in 
the short term, wage levels for skilled people would not change.
Does it pay off for 
apprentices?
Simulations using 
break-even wages
Additional assumptions
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The calculations were made using the average salaries per occupation and sector for 
skilled and unskilled workers. We transform these averages into lifetime earning 
streams with a convex shape using information about the impact of experience (and 
experience squared) from Mincer earnings regressions (e.g., Polachek 2008). Thus 
we assume that wages increase steeply in the first years of working life, flatten in the 
middle, and may even decrease when approaching retirement. We then calculate the 
interest rate that would be needed to equalise the income stream for the unskilled and 
the skilled person for each of the occupations and models.
The rates of return to education differ between the models not only because of 
differences in the apprentice pay but also because in Model 1 we assume that apprentices 
start their apprenticeship directly after finishing lower secondary education and then 
earn the skilled wage until the end of their working life. Conversely, in Model 2 and 3 
the apprentices would spend an additional three years in upper secondary education 
(without pay), which shortens the time available to earn the skilled wage. Rates of return 
to education differ among the occupations mainly because of the different skill premium 
observed today on the Italian labour market and, to a small extent, because of different 
break-even wages paid during the apprenticeship. 
From the empirical literature, we know that most people have rates of time preference 
above 5 %. In other words, they prefer an instant reward to a later payment, even if the 
later comes with a surplus of 5 %. Reading the results in Table 4, we therefore interpret 
rates of return to education that do not exceed 5 % as critical (numbers in bold in Table 
4), because these rates of return to education would most probably be too small to attract 
average students. 
table 4  Rates of return to education in percent – break-even wage scenario for firms – Italy
Occupations Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Application developers and software engineers 21.5 % 14.3 % 12.5 %
Bricklayers 5.0 % 3.5 % 3.1 %
Car mechanics 6.0 % 5.1 % 4.6 %
Commercial bank employees 23.7 % 14.1 % 12.9 %
Cooks 4.4 % 3.0 % 2.6 %
Electricians 5.1 % 3.5 % 3.2 %
Mechanical technicians 12.7 % 11.1 % 8.9 %
Shop salespersons 5.3 % 3.6 % 3.3 %
Waitresses/waiters1 0.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
1) the rate of return is so low for waitresses/waiters because the difference between skilled and unskilled wages is too 
small to justify the initial investment (in terms of forgone earnings during the training period).
source: own calculations; red numbers show rates that do not surpass the threshold of 5 %.
With the exception of cooks and waitresses/waiters (and bricklayers and electricians at 
the margin), apprenticeships of the Model 1 type generate rates of return to education 
that are sufficiently high. In Models 2 and 3, the rates of return to education also fall 
below the critical threshold of 5 % for the occupations of bricklayers, electricians and 
shop salespersons. For five out of the nine occupations which we used to simulate the 
costs and benefits of training for firms, apprentice pay guaranteeing zero net costs for 
the firms would be too low to generate rates of return to education for apprentices that 
we consider high enough to attract sufficiently talented youths into these programmes. 
Lifetime earnings
Rates of return depend on 
the duration of training 
models
Rate of return should 
exceed time preferences
High returns for 
individuals in most 
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In this section, we provide a summary of the results of the net cost simulations for all 
occupations and scenarios, separately for the North (Table 5), Centre (Table 6) and the 
South of Italy (Table 7). We provide the simulations at the regional level because of the 
large observed differences in regional wage levels, which can potentially affect expected 
net training costs. 
As the colours in the table show, there are no substantial qualitative differences in 
occupational net costs across the different regions, although the level of net training 
costs is highest in Northern Italy. The reason why wage levels have only a moderate 
effect (if any) on net training costs is that the wage effects on the costs (higher wages 
increase training expenditure) and on training benefits (higher wages increase the value 
of apprentices’ productive work) are almost identical in a training model that resembles 
that of Switzerland.27
We mark net costs in red where they are above € 3,000. Conversely, we mark net costs 
in light green when they are close to zero (more precisely, a bandwidth of +/- € 3,000). 
Finally, we mark net benefits that are above € 3,000 in dark green. As can easily be 
seen from the colour pattern, net costs in all models using the low-wage scenario 
are (except for mechanical technicians) in green or light green in at least some of the 
models, whereas in the high-wage scenario, all occupations in all models show red, 
meaning net costs are above € 3,000. Thus, as wages in the high-wage scenario are 
still substantially below current minimum apprentice wages, it becomes apparent 
that introducing a dual apprenticeship system similar to Switzerland would require 
lower apprentice wages for firms to break even by the end of training. Interestingly, 
mechanical technicians is the occupation with the highest net training costs for firms 
in the low-wage scenario, but also the occupation with the highest individual rate of 
return (Table 4). Thus, based on our simulation results, it would be possible to shift 
some of the training costs to the individual by lowering apprentice wages accordingly. 
As a result, we would expect lower net training costs to incentivize more firms to train 
apprentices in that occupation. Moreover, the occupation of mechanical technicians 
is demanding in terms of the amount of skills that apprentices need to acquire before 
they become fully proficient in skilled tasks. For that reason, the average relative 
productivity is lower in the third year of training compared to other occupations. As 
a result, Model 3 does generate additional net benefits for the training firm because, 
even in the low-wage scenario, the value of an apprentice’s productive tasks in the 
third training year does not exceed the sum of the wage costs and the costs for training 
instructors. Thus, for that occupation, the training duration might need to be extended 
27  Higher wages result in lower net costs in a training model where firms only provide little instruction (in terms 
of training hours) at the workplace and mainly use apprentices for productive tasks (i.e. as “cheap labour”).
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to four years to enable firms to break even by the end of the training period. However, 
as shown below, savings on future hiring costs may allow firms to recoup a significant 
fraction of the initial training investment. 
table 5   Net training costs for all occupations and scenarios – Northern Italy
Low-wage High-wage
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Application developers and  
software engineers
18,611 8,178 6,045 6,5272 39,285 52,705
Bricklayers –1,318 –2,490 –9,433 23,784 14,244 15,668
Car mechanics 9,851 4,459 3,954 34,963 21,200 29,065
Commercial bank employees 6,832 3,362 –5,218 45,924 29,424 33,874
Cooks –1,142 –2,230 –8,996 21,522 12,880 13,669
Electricians 7,769 4,445 492 49,399 32,198 42,122
Mechanical technicians 16,305 7,869 7,738 46,349 27,899 37,782
Shop salespersons –4,050 –4,605 –12,725 19,862 11,337 11,187
Waitresses/waiters –5,255 –4,052 –12,507 15,174 9,567 7,922
source: own calculations
The main reason why net benefits are high in the low-wage scenario in Model 3 is the 
relation of apprentice wages and the productivity of apprentices. Compared to the high-
cost scenario it becomes clear that the pay level for apprentices is a crucial factor in Italy. 
In the low-wage scenario, apprentice pay corresponds to about 25 % of a skilled worker’s 
wage, whereas in the high-wage scenario apprentices receive a wage equal to 50 % of a 
skilled worker’s wage in the corresponding occupation.
table 6   Net training costs for all occupations and scenarios – Central Italy
Low-wage High-wage
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Application developers and 
software engineers
7,995 3,246 –1,389 36,862 22,490 27,479
Bricklayers –499 –1,621 –7,334 19,065 11,422 12,230
Car mechanics 10,392 5,063 5,243 31,403 19,070 26,254
Commercial bank employees 7,252 3,858 –4,255 41,679 26,809 30,172
Cooks 1,383 –684 –6,419 23,164 13,836 15,363
Electricians –1,744 –1,743 –7,924 17,820 11,299 11,641
Mechanical technicians 20,859 10,878 12,682 50,285 30,495 42,108
Shop salespersons –3,395 –4,050 –11,962 18,405 10,484 9,838
Waitresses/waiters –3,961 –3,188 –11,162 15,203 9,587 8,002
source: own calculations
In Switzerland, many firms can generate a net benefit from training apprentices. It is, 
however, important to bear in mind that those net benefits are not simply a cash profit 
for firms, but in turn may serve as a competitive advantage for training firms, because 
they can charge lower prices for their products and services than competing firms that 
Explanations for high net 
benefits
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do not train apprentices. Therefore, a substantial part of the net benefit shown here is 
actually a gain for the customers.28
However, in Italy, the private rates of return to education (Table 4) are not particularly 
high, and in fact they are lowest in those occupations for which we simulate the 
highest net training benefits in the low-wage scenario of Model 3. Thus, a fraction of 
the expected net benefits that training firms could expect should be used for higher 
apprentice salaries. Moreover, as apprentices receive better training in our simulated 
models, they should become more productive after completing training compared to 
the current situation in Italy, which should also lead to a higher future wage differential 
between skilled electricians and unskilled individuals who work in that sector. 
table 7   Net training costs for all occupations and scenarios – Southern Italy
Low-wage High-wage
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Application developers and 
software engineers
12,180 5,160 –366 51,207 31,178 38,661
Bricklayers 1,178 –488 –4,681 18,708 11,198 12,849
Car mechanics 8,603 4,000 3,613 27,767 16,776 22,778
Commercial bank employees 6,521 3,479 –4,509 39,038 25,157 28,008
Cooks 3,367 658 –3,080 22,271 13,261 15,824
Electricians 402 –323 –4,771 17,932 11,364 12,759
Mechanical technicians 15,608 7,697 7,729 40,750 24,458 32871
Shop salespersons –2,044 –2,919 –9,118 16,238 9,269 9,165
Waitresses/waiters –2,726 –2,304 –8,885 13,983 8,835 7,824
source: own calculations
Different explanations are needed for the cases in which net costs in the high-wage 
scenario are extremely high, as is the case for mechanical technicians and car mechanics, 
commercial bank employees, or application developers and software engineers. A main 
explanation is a higher amount of practising that reduces the training benefits and 
would therefore legitimise a lower apprentice wage. In the case of bricklayers, cooks, 
shop salespersons and waitresses/waiters, it is the small differential between unskilled 
and skilled salaries that pushes down the break-even salaries. If the wage differential 
between skilled and unskilled salaries is small, then the productive contribution of 
apprentices, when substituting skilled labour at low productivity rates, is also very 
low. If, however, the wage differential is large, a firm earns more when letting the 
apprentice substitute for skilled workers instead of executing unskilled work even at low 
productivity rates in the first year(s) of the apprenticeship training. To give an idea of 
the heterogeneity in the wage data used for these simulations, we used an observed skill 
premium (the ratio between skilled workers in the occupation and unskilled workers in 
the same economic sector) that ranges from almost 55 % for application developers and 
software engineers to just 7 % for waitresses/waiters.
28  Conversely, one could also argue that in markets where firms have substantial monopoly power, any costs 
related to apprenticeship training could simply be charged to the customer. However, given the ongoing 
deregulation in product markets, and the fact that very few Italian firms train apprentices, it seems unlikely 
that this is a realistic scenario.
Explanations for 
high net costs
53
summary analyses of the results
The net costs in Tables 5-7 are calculated at the end of the training period, and because 
additional benefits can accrue after this point, we compare these net costs with potential 
savings in hiring costs if the firm is able to keep the apprentices and employ them as 
skilled workers after the training contract has ended. Table 8 displays the long-term net 
training costs when also incorporating savings on future hiring costs (because a firm 
does not need to hire externally to fill a vacancy). In this scenario we assume that a firm 
can retain all apprentices after training (i.e. the retention rate is 100 %). As we do not 
have sufficient observations to calculate such hiring costs for every occupation in every 
region, Table 8 displays the results for Italy in general. 
Green shows all the cases where there is already a net benefit of > € 3,000 by the end of the 
training period or where potential savings in hiring costs would cover the net costs incurred, 
assuming that a firm will always be able to retain an apprentice. Light green indicates the 
cases where total net costs are close to zero (+/- € 3,000), and red highlights the cases where 
the hiring costs do not cover the net costs (i.e. total net costs > € 3,000). Table 8 clearly 
shows that all occupations in the low-wage scenario could be profitable given that a firm 
can retain a graduate apprentice. In the high-wage scenario, even when accounting for 
hiring costs, the occupations of application developers, software engineers and cooks never 
become profitable in any training model. Moreover, Model 1 never becomes profitable in the 
high-wage scenario even when accounting for future savings in hiring costs.
table 8   Total net training costs when including savings on hiring costs  
(retention rate = 100 %) – Italy
Low-wage High-wage
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Application developers and 
software engineers
–12,388 –21,158 –24,195 26,686 4,891 14,878
Bricklayers –9,623 –10,801 –16,821 10,857 2,852 3,658
Car mechanics –15,808 –21,103 –21,196 5,520 –6,884 132
Commercial bank employees –21,028 –24,849 –32,754 14,268 –1,319 2,542
Cooks –8,174 –10,141 –15,620 12,492 3,636 5,046
Electricians –12,134 –12,130 –18,649 8,346 1,524 1,831
Mechanical technicians –21,119 –30,344 –29,498 7,084 –11,541 –1,294
Shop salespersons –13,360 –14,244 –21,482 7,518 –325 –605
source: own calculations. waitresses/waiters are excluded from this table because we  
do not have data on hiring costs.
In reality, however, firms will never retain all of their apprentices. In Switzerland, only 
about 35 % of apprentices are still employed with the training firm one year after graduation, 
whereas in Germany the corresponding proportion is about 60 %. Some apprentices will 
leave the firm, while the training firm may decide that some apprentices are not a good 
match, or because they do not have any skilled worker vacancies to fill. Therefore, we 
also show how the results change when we assume a retention rate of only 50 % (Table 9). 
The results show that even when only retaining half of the apprentices after training, all 
occupations in the low-wage scenario become profitable from the firm’s perspective (except 
for application developers and software engineers in Model 1). In the high-wage scenario, 
however, only training electricians would be profitable from the firm’s perspective.
Potential savings in  
hiring costs
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summary analyses of the results
table 9   Total net training costs when including savings on hiring costs  
(retention rate = 50 %) – Italy
Low-wage High-wage
Occupation M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3 
Application developers and 
software engineers
1,839 –6,931 –9,968 40,913 19,118 29,106
Bricklayers –5,067 –6,245 –12,266 15,413 7,408 8,214
Car mechanics –2,832 –8,128 –8,221 18,496 6,091 13,107
Commercial bank employees –6,393 –10,215 –18,120 28,902 13,316 17,176
Cooks –3,422 –5,389 –10,868 17,244 8,388 9,798
Electricians –6,985 –6,980 –13,500 13,495 6,673 6,980
Mechanical technicians –1,191 –10,415 –9,569 27,013 8,388 18,635
Shop salespersons –7,989 –8,873 –16,112 12,889 5,045 4,766
source: own calculations. waitresses/waiters are excluded from this table because we  
do not have data on hiring costs.
To sum up, the savings in hiring costs have the potential to cover the net costs in the 
low-wage scenario across all occupations, provided the firms are able to retain at least 
half of their apprentices after training, but savings on hiring costs are not sufficiently 
high to cover a firm’s initial net investment in the high-wage scenario. 
In the final step, we compare the perspective of the firm to that of potential apprentices. 
Based on the high-wage scenario in Model 2, we only find a rate of return that is above 
5 % for the occupations application developer & software engineer, car mechanic, 
commercial bank employee and mechanical technician. The comparison of net costs for 
firms (including potential savings in hiring costs, as shown in Table 9) shows that the 
training firms would have the scope to raise apprentice wages above 50 % of the skilled 
worker wages in the training occupations cook, electrician and shop salesperson, so that 
individual rates of return would be sufficiently high to encourage more individuals to 
apply for apprenticeship positions. 
However, training firms could find a way to increase the attractiveness in occupations 
that currently result in expected net costs for firms as well as low rates of return to 
education for individuals. Potential apprentices would probably be willing to accept 
low salaries during training if firms were to invest sufficiently in training, so that 
apprentices could expect skilled wages after training that are above currently observed 
levels on the Italian labour market. Firms would not incur higher net costs and therefore 
would not need to fear poaching from competitors, and potential apprentices could 
compensate the lower salaries during training through better salary prospects for the 
following years of their professional life.
Motivations to train 
in occupations with 
net costs
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The simulated cost and benefits of apprenticeship training in this study show the 
potential outcomes for firms from the hypothetical situation in which firms in Italy 
were to adopt an apprenticeship training model that resembles the Swiss one. Not 
surprisingly, these simulated costs and benefits show a considerable heterogeneity 
due to differences in the results per occupation in the Swiss data and due to variations 
in the wage differentials between unskilled and skilled Italian workers in the nine 
training occupations. Thus, the question whether a training firm would have to expect 
net costs or could rather enjoy a net benefit when applying a Swiss-style training model 
depends on many factors that will differ from one occupation to another. Furthermore, 
the simulations show that, within a given occupation, results may vary across regions 
between firms of different sizes. In any case, the simulations show that policies aimed 
at increasing the number of apprenticeships would need to take into account these 
heterogeneities between occupations, firms, and regions.
The four main conclusions that we can draw from our simulations are the following: 
1.  In five out of the nine occupations, at least one of the models in the low-wage 
scenario produces net benefits for the training firms, but not for any occupation in 
the high-wage scenario. The setting of apprentice wages is paramount when it comes 
to ensuring that firms are able to break even by the end of apprenticeship training. 
This finding is of particular importance with regard to the current situation in Italy, 
where apprentices receive an open-ended contract.
2.  In all of the nine occupations, at least two models in the low-wage scenario produce 
net benefits when including savings in future hiring costs. Such hiring costs are 
substantial and range, depending on the occupation, from 3 to 15 months of skilled 
worker salaries. From a firm’s perspective, we find that they could offset initial 
net training costs if they retained at least 50 % of their former apprentices after 
graduation. In the high-wage scenario, the occupations application developer, 
software engineer and cook are no longer profitable for firms even if they retained 
100 % of their apprentices after training. 
  As recently discussed (Cedefop 2017), switching to fixed-term apprenticeship 
contracts, as in Germany or Switzerland, might be an effective strategy to increase 
the number of apprenticeship places in Italy. However, fixed-term apprenticeship 
contracts might also increase the post-training mobility of apprentices and therefore 
firms would need to be able to train in a cost-effective manner – which would not be 
possible given the high level of current minimum wages for apprentices. Moreover, 
some occupations, such as mechanical technician, produce simulation outcomes that 
Representation of the 
results
Four main results
Training firms can 
only break even at low 
apprentice wages
Savings on future hiring 
costs for training firms 
are substantial
9  Conclusions and recommendations  
based on the analyses
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ConClusions and reCommendations based on the analyses 
show difficulties for firms to break even, except in a low-wage scenario when the 
retention rate of graduate apprentices is close to 100 %. Thus, for such occupations, 
a training duration of four (rather than three or only two) years might be more 
appropriate.29
  In large-scale apprenticeship systems such as Switzerland or Germany, small firms 
train a significant proportion of all apprentices and are therefore an important pillar 
for the functioning of a dual apprenticeship system. Unlike large firms, however, 
small benefit less from post-training benefits in the form of savings in future hiring 
costs, because small firms not only have fewer vacancies to fill, but also face a higher 
probability that apprentices will move on to other (often larger) firms after training. 
Therefore, to ensure that as many firms as possible participate in an apprenticeship 
system and provide high-quality training, it is important that training policies allow 
small firms to train apprentices cost-effectively (e.g., by ensuring that minimum 
apprentice wages are not set too high). 
3.  Our simulated rates of return to a VET qualification are particularly low (a rate 
of return <5 %) in the occupations bricklayer, cook, electrician, shop salesperson 
and waitresses/waiters (even in a high-wage scenario). Therefore, apprenticeship 
training provides little financial incentive for individuals and partly explains why 
the proportion of apprenticeships in Italy is currently very low, despite the fact 
that actual apprentice wages are even higher compared to our simulated high-wage 
scenario. High apprentice wages, however, might also be a reason why there are not 
enough firms willing to train apprentices in the first place.
4.  Improvements in the quality of apprenticeship programmes that lead to better labour 
market outcomes for individuals could be a necessity to secure talented applicants 
for the programmes and simultaneously reduce dropout rates during training. 
  One of the major challenges for a successful expansion of an apprenticeship training 
system in Italy that will create a win-win situation for firms and apprentices is 
a quality improvement in programmes (see also OECD 2017b). For some of the 
occupations, training that translates into substantial increases in productivity 
compared to the current situation is needed to make these programmes attractive 
for both potential training firms and apprentices. As better training quality has its 
price, some firms may be less willing to hire apprentices. Therefore, a consequence 
of switching to a higher-quality apprenticeship system would be to shift some of the 
training costs to individuals by lowering training wages. 
  However, as high-quality training is likely to attract better apprentices, firms may 
have an incentive to invest in even more training, particularly when they intend 
to retain an apprentice subsequently as a skilled worker. As a result, apprentices 
would be more productive, not only in the training firm, but in all firms that 
demand skilled workers in a particular occupation, leading to better employment 
opportunities for apprentices. In turn, the productivity of an industry as a whole 
would increase, and therefore also the individual’s skills wage premium associated 
with an apprenticeship qualification.
29  Note that the training duration in Swiss occupations is also subject to ongoing reforms. The training duration 
in a number of occupations that currently lasts three years may possibly be increased to four years.
Individual rates of return 
to an apprenticeship 
qualification are low
Increases in the quality 
of training crucial
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aPPendiCes  aPPliCation develoPers and software engineers
Application developers and software engineers
table a1  Net training costs – Application developers and software engineers – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring Costs
low 16,067 7,296 4,259 7.5
high 55,140 33,346 43,333
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a1   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – 
Application developers and software engineers – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a2  Net costs by firm size – Application developers and software engineers – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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aPPendiCes  aPPliCation develoPers and software engineers
figure a3   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Application developers and software engineers – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a4   Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Application developers and 
software engineers – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario)
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aPPendiCes  briCklayers
Bricklayers
table a2  Net training costs – Bricklayers – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring Costs
low –511 –1,689 –7,710 4.6
high 19,968 11,964 12,770  
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a5   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – 
Bricklayers – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a6  Net costs by firm size – Bricklayers – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
N
et
 t
ra
in
in
g 
co
st
s 
in
 e
u
ro
s
Firm size
–9,000
–8,000
–7,000
–6,000
–5,000
–4,000
–3,000
–2,000
–1,000
0
1,000
Model 3
Model 2
Model 1
50–500+11–491–10
Model 3Model 2Model 1
63
aPPendiCes  briCklayers
figure a7   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Bricklayers – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a8  Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Bricklayers – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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aPPendiCes  Car meChaniCs
Car mechanics
table a3  Net training costs – Car mechanics – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring Costs
low 10,143 4,848 4,754 12.6
high 31,471 19,067 26,083  
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a9   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training –  
Car mechanics – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
Net costs
Gross Benefits
Gross Costs
Total3rd year2nd year1st year
N
et
 c
o
st
s 
in
 e
u
ro
s
Net costsGross benefitsGross costs
figure a10  Net costs by firm size – Car mechanics – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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aPPendiCes  Car meChaniCs
figure a11   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Car mechanics – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a12   Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Car mechanics – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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aPPendiCes  Cooks
Cooks
table a4  Net training costs – Cooks – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring Costs
low 1,330 –637 –6,117 4.8
high 21,996 13,140 14,549  
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a13   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – Cooks 
– Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a14  Net costs by firm size – Cooks – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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aPPendiCes  Cooks
figure a15   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Cooks – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a16  Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Cooks – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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aPPendiCes  eleCtriCians
Electricians
table a5  Net training costs – Electricians – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring costs
low –1,836 –1,831 –8,351 5.2
high 18,644 11,822 12,129  
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a17   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – 
Electricians – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a18  Net costs by firm size – Electricians – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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aPPendiCes  eleCtriCians
figure a19   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Electricians – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a20  Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Electricians – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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aPPendiCes  meChaniCal teChniCians
Mechanical technicians
table a6  Net training costs – Mechanical technicians – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring Costs
low 18,738 9,514 10,360 14.6
high 46,942 28,317 38,564  
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a21   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – 
Mechanical technicians – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a22  Net costs by firm size – Mechanical technicians – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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aPPendiCes  meChaniCal teChniCians
figure a23   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Mechanical technicians – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a24   Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Mechanical technicians – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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Shop salesperson
table a7  Net training costs – Shop salesperson – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Hiring Costs
low –2,618 –3,503 –10,741 5.3
high 18,259 10,416 10,136  
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. hiring costs in months of skilled worker wages. 
figure a25   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – Shop 
salesperson – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a26  Net costs by firm size – Shop salesperson – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a27   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Shop salesperson – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a28   Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Shop salesperson – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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aPPendiCes  waitresses/waiters
Waitresses/waiters
table a8  Net training costs – Waitresses/waiters – Italy
Wage Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
low –3,697 –2,997 –10,664
high 14,805 9,338 7,839
source: own calculations. net training costs in euros. unfortunately, we did not receive any  
responses about hiring costs for this occupation.
figure a29   Gross costs, productivity, and net training costs by year of training – 
Waitresses/waiters – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a30  Net costs by firm size – Waitresses/waiters – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 (low-wage scenario)
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figure a31   Break-even analysis of apprentice wage relative to unskilled and skilled 
wages – Waitresses/waiters – Italy
Source: own calculations
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figure a32  Net costs assuming different dropout rates – Waitresses/waiters – Italy
Source: own calculations, based on model 1 and 2 (low- and high-wage scenario) 
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